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The classical dichotomy between cognition and emotion equated the first with rationality
or logic and the second with irrational behaviors. The idea that cognition and emotion
are separable, antagonistic forces competing for dominance of mind has been hard
to displace despite abundant evidence to the contrary. For instance, it is now known
that a pathological absence of emotion leads to profound impairment of decision
making. Behavioral observations of this kind are corroborated at the mechanistic level:
neuroanatomical studies reveal that brain areas typically described as underlying either
cognitive or emotional processes are linked in ways that imply complex interactions that
do not resemble a simple mutual antagonism. Instead, physiological studies and network
simulations suggest that top–down signals from prefrontal cortex realize “cognitive
control” in part by either suppressing or promoting emotional responses controlled by
the amygdala, in a way that facilitates adaptation to changing task demands. Behavioral,
anatomical, and physiological data suggest that emotion and cognition are equal partners
in enabling a continuum or matrix of flexible behaviors that are subserved by multiple
brain regions acting in concert. Here we focus on neuroanatomical data that highlight
circuitry that structures cognitive-emotional interactions by directly or indirectly linking
prefrontal areas with the amygdala. We also present an initial computational circuit model,
based on anatomical, physiological, and behavioral data to explicitly frame the learning
and performance mechanisms by which cognition and emotion interact to achieve flexible
behavior.
Keywords: amygdala, orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), thalamic reticular nucleus, computational neuroscience, neural
network, emotions, cognition, neuroanatomy
1. INTRODUCTION: INTEGRATING EMOTION AND
COGNITION INTO ADAPTIVE PERCEPTION-ACTION
LOOPS
The debate on the nature of cognition and emotion is a mod-
ern scientific manifestation of an age-old dichotomy. “Cognition”
has come to refer to an assortment of useful behaviors—such
as attention, memory, and symbolic reasoning, while “emotion”
carries with it the connotation of behavior that is irrational, evo-
lutionarily ancient, and antithetical to efficient rationality. In this
paper we outline findings that demonstrate both functional and
Abbreviations: AA, anterior amygdaloid area; ACC, anterior cingulate cortex;
Amy, amygdala; aOFC, anterior orbitofrontal cortex (primates); BA, basal nucleus
of amygdala; BLA, basolateral amygdala; BMA, basomedial amygdala; Ce, central
nucleus of amygdala; CeL, lateral subdivision of Ce; CeM,medial subdivision of Ce;
CS, conditioned stimulus; CTX, cortex (model); IL, infralimbic cortex (rodents);
ILd, projection from IL to ITCd (rodents); ILv, projection from IL to ITCv
(rodents); IM, intercalated masses (primates); ITC, intercalated cells (rodents);
ITCd, dorsal intercalated cell group (rodents); ITCv, ventral intercalated cell group
(rodents); LA, lateral nucleus of amygdala; MD, mediodorsal nucleus of thalamus;
Me, medial nucleus of amygdala; NBM, nucleus basalis of Meynert; PL, prelimbic
cortex (rodents); pOFC, posterior orbitofrontal cortex (primates); SI, substantia
innominata; SNc, substantia nigra pars compacta; Thal, thalamus; TRN, thala-
mic reticular nucleus; US, unconditioned stimulus; VCo, ventral cortical nucleus
of amygdala; VTA, ventral tegmental area.
anatomical overlap between cognitive and emotional processes,
and use computational modeling to illustrate how learning pro-
cesses may make cognitive-emotional interactions adaptive. We
focus on a computational neural network model of the amygdalar
local circuit, a key hub embedded in a larger system that integrates
cognitive and emotional processes.
We begin by describing a plausible functional perspective to
frame cognition and emotion as subcomponents of a unified sys-
tem devoted to categorize bodily and environmental “inputs,” and
link the categorized inputs with appropriate behavioral “outputs.”
A typical episode of mental life involves three distinctive, but
interacting cognitive steps, and each one can vary in complex-
ity: “identifying X, evaluating it as Y, and preparing for behavior
that is suitable for X as Y” (cf. Pessoa, 2010). Although the
third step, preparation for behavior, is quite diverse, it usually
involves at least heightened attention, intentional indifference, or
active ignoring. The first and third steps are often labeled with
a cognitively-loaded term, e.g., “object categorization” or “stim-
ulus recognition” for step one, and “strategy” or “plan” for step
three. The second step, which involves evaluating the present-time
significance of X for the agent, is more often labeled with a less
cognitively-loaded term such as “affective evaluation,” “emotion,”
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or “visceral reaction,” depending on the intensity of the positive or
negative evaluation. Nevertheless, all three steps can be regarded
as cognitive, because all are facets of the agent’s “coming to know”
(the meaning of the root of “cognition”) and all steps are capa-
ble of being corrected, if in error, by further experience. Thus,
an object may be briefly misidentified as X until further expe-
rience leads to a re-categorization; a stimulus X may be initially
construed as an omen of future outcome Y, but re-construed as
irrelevant when Y repeatedly fails to follow X; and a plan of action
suitable for responding to X as Y in one setting may need to be
revised to become effective in another setting.
Though reason and emotion have been viewed as opposed pro-
cesses in popular culture since ancient times, emotions have been
treated as adaptive behavioral phenotypes by scientists since the
time of Darwin (1872). Treating emotion as an adaptive phe-
notype fundamentally subverts any reason-emotion antithesis,
because it places emotion as another, if distinctive, enabler of
“biological rationality” (Damasio, 1994). Animals have a com-
plex array of cognitive operations to draw upon, and an animal
is rational if it knows or can learn how to draw upon those
operations to maximize its well-being and minimize threats. In
recent years, neuroscientists have shown that the parts of the
brain that are recruited during episodes with emotion-arousing
stimuli are also de-recruited when no emotion arousing stimuli
are present, or when an animal learns that formerly emotion-
arousing cues can be safely ignored (e.g., LaBar et al., 1998;
Sehlmeyer et al., 2009; Bach et al., 2011; Hartley et al., 2011; van
Well et al., 2012). Emotion is indeed a highly adaptive behavioral
phenotype.
To better understand cognitive-emotional interactions, we
have begun to develop “full-cycle” learning models that expli-
cate how an animal uses its experiences to “come to know”
when to engage, disengage, and re-engage its emotional evalu-
ations, to maximize its well-being, and minimize threats, in a
highly context-dependent way. Studies of repeated full cycles of
acquisition and extinction of Pavlovian associations, as well as
studies of repeated learning of experimenter-reversed instrumen-
tal (act-outcome) associations, generally show that very little of
the associative memory formed during initial acquisition is lost
during extinction or reversal phases (e.g., Schoenbaum et al.,
2007; Stalnaker et al., 2007). Instead, the neural control system
is thought to recruit further pathways that are capable of selec-
tively preventing the expression of prior learning, thus leaving the
underlying memory intact.
Otherwise well-regarded formal learning models (e.g.,
Rescorla and Wagner, 1972) have been incapable of explaining
full-cycle learning, because they incorrectly treat extinction as a
process that erases most or all of the specific associative memo-
ries formed during acquisition (Pearce and Bouton, 2001). For
example, neural variants of such models have usually assumed
that memories are coded in experience-sensitive synaptic weight
values, and that these values greatly increment during acquisition,
but severely decrement during extinction training. Although
bi-directional synaptic adjustments have been observed during
learning protocols at many central synapses (e.g., Diamond et al.,
2005; López de Armentia and Sah, 2007; Müller et al., 2009;
Dalton et al., 2012), a model using only the decrementing of
learned weights for extinction cannot readily explain data on
memory preservation. Notably, reacquisition following even
very protracted extinction is much faster than initial acquisition
(Napier et al., 1992; Ricker and Bouton, 1996), a phenomenon
referred to as “savings” because much of the prior learning is
saved from erasure by the extinction process. However, there may
be exceptions to this avoidance of erasure. For example, studies
in humans suggest that there may be a window of opportunity
during which the efficiency of extinction can be enhanced,
reducing or preventing such savings (Schiller et al., 2008, 2009).
Our treatment of emotions as part of the rational apparatus
of the brain does not preclude also treating emotions as potential
sources of irrationality. Emotions as such can lead to maladap-
tive decisions and behavior if either the learning processes for
engaging and disengaging emotions, or the auto-regulatory cir-
cuits for controlling the intensity and duration of emotions, are
or become dysfunctional. Here the study of full-cycle learning
models, suitably rooted in the real circuitry of the brain, should
be able to make pivotal contributions. For example, certain
learned attractions and fears become obsessive, and extremely
resistant to spontaneous reduction. If we understand the full set
of processes that enable the normative (i.e., highly flexible and
experience-responsive) use of emotional evaluations, then we will
also understand which parametric variations of such processes
lead to dysfunctions; and we will be able to classify the distinct
types of dysfunction. The latter is key for designing minimal-
side-effect interventions (whether behavioral, pharmacological,
or a mix) that are tailored to the problem. The model introduced
here is already illuminating in this regard. Below we present the
computational learning model after an overview of forebrain cir-
cuits implicated in flexible emotional evaluations, including key
structures used in the model. Thus, we constrain and comple-
ment the high-level functional approach with an examination
of the underlying neuronal circuitry. Using the structural model
for connections (Barbas and Rempel-Clower, 1997), we can infer
the flow of information relating to sensation, cognition, and
emotion along neural pathways. We also describe how frontal
cortical regions interact directly and indirectly with the amyg-
dala, the largely subcortical structure most often implicated in
emotional processes. Thus, we connect cognition and emotion
in two ways—(1) functionally, as equal partners in enabling a
continuum or matrix of processes required for adaptive, flexi-
ble behavior, and (2) neurally, via diverse cortical and subcortical
pathways.
These functional and anatomical perspectives are then inte-
grated via computational modeling. We demonstrate how a
neural network model sheds light on the possible mechanisms
by which frontal cortical areas influence emotional process-
ing in the amygdala, using classical fear conditioning in the
amygdala as an example. Physiological studies from humans
and primates are incomplete for the amygdalar circuit, so we
also refer to the rodent literature to guide our specification
of the model. The amygdalar circuit has rarely been mod-
eled computationally, and therefore we began the computational
component of our study here. In recent years this circuit has
been delineated in increasing detail, and its complex dynam-
ics are beginning to be understood. Our modeling approach
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is designed to address some basic questions about emotional
learning and behavior. What are some of the implications of
the connectivity of the amygdalar local circuit? How does the
connectivity allow the system to learn fear associations, and
also learn to suppress them when appropriate? Is the amygdalar
circuit simply a generator of responses and a repository of emo-
tional memories, or can it participate in information-processing?
How might top–down modulatory signals from prefrontal cor-
tex affect the system? In addition to shedding light on these
questions, model simulations capture past experimental findings,
despite being a schematized approximation of the real amygdalar
circuit.
2. ROLES OF THE AMYGDALA IN EMOTIONAL PROCESSING
AND LEARNING
Pioneering work on the effects of lesions on the behavior of
animals led to the gradual uncovering of emotion-related brain
regions (reviewed in Maren, 2001). This work was stimulated in
part by Darwin (1872), who was among the first to place emo-
tion in a biological setting, arguing that emotional states in both
humans and animals correspond with neurological phenomena
related to movement. The Greek word for emotion (συγκι´νηση)
also refers to movement. The temporal lobe was the first brain
region to be associated with emotional processing (Brown and
Schäfer, 1888; Klüver and Bucy, 1937). Removal of the tempo-
ral lobe produced marked changes in behavior. Papez (1937)
integrated earlier work to propose that an ensemble of linked
structures including the hypothalamus, the cingulate gyrus, the
hippocampus, and the anterior thalamus form the anatomical
basis of emotions (Cannon and Britton, 1925; Cannon, 1927;
Bard, 1928). Subsequent work established that the amygdala is
also a key element in what came to be known as the Papez–
MacLean limbic model (Papez, 1937; Spiegel et al., 1940; Bard and
Mountcastle, 1948; MacLean, 1949; Weiskrantz, 1956).
Studies in humans and other animals employing a variety of
experimental methods, have provided further evidence on the
role of the amygdala in emotion (LeDoux, 1992; Kalin et al., 2004;
McGaugh, 2004; Vuilleumier, 2005). The amygdala appears to be
necessary for Pavlovian fear conditioning, playing a role in acqui-
sition and expression of fear responses (Maren, 2001), and in the
maintenance and retrieval of fear-related memories (e.g., Erlich
et al., 2012). But the amygdala is no longer seen as dedicated solely
to negative emotions—it also appears to play a role in appetitive
conditioning tasks (Everitt et al., 2003), consistent with findings
from functional imaging suggesting a role in positive emotions
(reviewed in Fossati, 2012).
The amygdala serves as an important recipient of converging
projections from much of the cortical mantle, the hypothala-
mus, the hippocampus, the brain stem, and the neuromod-
ulatory systems (reviewed in Sah et al., 2003; Pessoa, 2008).
Thus, the connectivity suggests that the amygdala is in a posi-
tion to contribute to the categorization of the overall state of
the organism by integrating information from the body and
the external environment. Such categorical representations can
then affect sensory, motor, executive, and memory-related pro-
cesses via the amygdala’s diverging outputs (McGaugh, 2002; Sah
et al., 2003; Vuilleumier et al., 2004; Hadj-Bouziane et al., 2008).
The amygdala can mediate widespread effects via projections to
cortical areas (especially prefrontal cortex and the medial tempo-
ral lobe), as well as the striatum, nucleus accumbens, thalamus,
hypothalamus, and the neurotransmitter systems (Cardinal et al.,
2002; Whalen and Phelps, 2009), i.e., the cholinergic, dopamin-
ergic, noradrenergic, and serotonergic structures. Within the
forebrain, these projections are strongly implicated in attention,
learning, and memory (e.g., Kilgard and Merzenich, 1998; Bao
et al., 2001; McGaugh, 2004; Hasselmo, 2006; Parikh and Sarter,
2008; Miasnikov et al., 2009; Ramanathan et al., 2009; Froemke
and Martins, 2011; Chau and Galvez, 2012; Medalla and Barbas,
2012).
In summary, a coarse-grained survey of amygdala connectiv-
ity suggests that it is in a position to influence, and be influenced
by, a variety of neural processes necessary for flexible behavior
(see Barbas et al., 2011). The amygdala has a “panoramic view”
of internal and external context, and appears to be instrumental
in the adaptive control of behavioral states, some of which cor-
respond with emotions (Figure 1). The posterior orbitofrontal
cortex (pOFC) has a similarly wide-angled view of body and
environment (Barbas, 1995). Perhaps unsurprisingly given this
connectional similarity, the pOFC is also implicated in emo-
tional processing, and was incorporated into the Papez–Maclean
circuit by Yakovlev (1948) and Nauta (1979). Imaging studies
in human patients suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD), phobias and social anxiety disorder suggest amygdalar
involvement in emotion, particularly negative emotions (e.g.,
Etkin and Wager, 2007; Nitschke et al., 2009). To demonstrate
how the amygdalar circuit is situated within a larger cognition-
emotion continuum or matrix, below we review the interactions
among prefrontal cortical regions, particularly the pOFC, and the
amygdala.
3. NEURAL SUBSTRATES FOR COGNITIVE-EMOTIONAL
INTERACTIONS: PATHWAYS THROUGH ORBITOFRONTAL
CORTEX AND THE AMYGDALA
The following overview of pathways linking structures associated
with cognitive and emotional processes in the mammalian brain
has two objectives. First, to outline the essential neural struc-
tures used for the model that follows. Second, to demonstrate the
need for a model in view of the complexity of the connections.
This overview focuses on the intricate connections between the
orbitofrontal cortex and the amygdala, regions classically asso-
ciated with emotion, and lateral prefrontal cortices, which are
thought to be key mediators of cognition. The cingulate gyrus
and the pOFC were the first prefrontal cortical regions to be
associated with emotions (Papez, 1937; Yakovlev, 1948; Nauta,
1979). Both orbitofrontal and anterior cingulate cortices (ACC)
are connected with lateral prefrontal cortices. The circuits suggest
that these neural structures have a profound influence on each
other, inextricably linking emotion and cognition (Barbas, 1995,
2000b; Rolls and Grabenhorst, 2008; Fox et al., 2010; Shackman
et al., 2011). This linkage is necessary for normal function and
its disruption is at the root of a wide variety of psychiatric
disorders.
The circuitry that links pOFC with the amygdala suggests a
role in forming emotional associations needed to navigate in a
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FIGURE 1 | Schematic circuit linking sensory cortex, prefrontal cortex, thalamus, and amygdala. This network is the proposed basis for the sensory
aspect of the cognition-emotion continuum or matrix that facilitates flexible, adaptive behaviors. Note that the TRN is shown as a shell around the thalamus.
complex and potentially dangerous environment, and in over-
riding these associations when they are no longer relevant in
behavior. Which specific pathways support the flexible formation
of emotional associations and their disengagement, as needed?
The connectivity alone points to the potential of these circuits to
set the system on alert or return it to a quiescent state (Barbas
et al., 2003). But the intricacies of these pathways suggest that
connectivity alone is not sufficient to infer all their dynamic prop-
erties. Computational modeling may assist us in this goal, and
also serves as a natural conceptual bridge to link anatomy with
physiology. Here we describe the key experimentally determined
pathways, providing the framework of a model to address the
issue of forming flexible associations.
The posterior strip of the orbitofrontal cortex (pOFC) in
macaque monkeys is of special interest for several reasons. The
pOFC is by far the most multimodal among prefrontal cortices,
and likely the entire cortex (Barbas and Zikopoulos, 2006), and
may therefore be the chief sensor of the environment, a cortical
counterpart of the older and mostly subcortical amygdala. The
pOFC receives information from every sensory system through
monosynaptic projections from high-order sensory association
cortices including visual, auditory, somatosensory and gustatory
cortices, and uniquely from primary olfactory cortices. Further,
the pOFC receives robust projections from limbic cortices: the
cingulate cortex, the temporal pole, medial (rhinal) temporal cor-
tices and the anterior insula (Barbas, 1993; Carmichael and Price,
1995). We can view the limbic cortices as sensors of the inter-
nal, or emotional environment. Based on these connections, the
pOFCmay be the main cortical sensor of the external and internal
environment (Figure 1).
The same sensory association and limbic cortices that project
to pOFC also project to the amygdala (Figure 1), which in turn
has robust bidirectional connections with the pOFC. This cir-
cuitry suggests that pathways from cortices that process environ-
mental signals reach pOFC through a direct route as well as via an
indirect route through the amygdala (Porrino et al., 1981; Barbas
and De Olmos, 1990; reviewed in, Barbas, 1995, 2000b).
The primate orbitofrontal cortex is connected mainly with
the basal amygdalar complex (BLA), composed of the basolateral
(BL), basomedial (BM; also known as accessory basal), and the
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lateral (LA) nuclei (Ghashghaei and Barbas, 2002). Sparser con-
nections are also found with the cortical nuclei of the amygdala.
Projection neurons from the basal amygdala innervate most
robustly the pOFC as well as the ACC, which forms a crescent at
the anterior tip of the corpus callosum. The term ACC here refers
to the anterior part of areas 24, 32, and 25 in macaque monkeys.
The connections of the pOFC and ACC with the amygdala are
bidirectional but not equivalent in each direction (Ghashghaei
et al., 2007). The projections from the amygdala to pOFC are
stronger than the reciprocal projections, while the opposite is true
for the ACC. The ACC sends the most robust return projections
to the amygdala.
3.1. FLOW OF INFORMATION FOR EMOTIONS THROUGH SENSORY
CORTICES, PREFRONTAL CORTICES, AND AMYGDALA
How is information about the external environment evaluated for
salience to guide behavior? Information about the entire external
environment reaches both the amygdala and pOFC. Sequential
pathways from sensory cortices to the amygdala and then to pOFC
may supply additional information required to assess the affective
meaning of environmental signals. The anatomical reasoning that
leads to this proposal begins with the study of the laminar origin
of projections from sensory association cortices to the amygdala
(Barbas, 2007; Hoistad and Barbas, 2008).
These findings show that sensory association cortices can
engage in feedforward signaling to the amygdala, which may
in turn categorize the arriving signals based on their affective
salience (e.g., Lim et al., 2009; Pourtois et al., 2010a) and convey
the results of this categorization to pOFC, where further integra-
tion can occur. From the panoramic vantage point of the pOFC,
this integrated information is transmitted to the rest of the pre-
frontal cortex along pathwayswe examine below. Interestingly, the
connections of pOFC and sensory cortices greatly overlap within
the basal nuclei in the posterior half of the amygdala, suggesting
an efficient passage of salient sensory stimuli from the amygdala
to pOFC (Ghashghaei and Barbas, 2002).
Information from the amygdala can thus be followed to pOFC,
which is associated with processing the value of stimuli, and from
there to lateral prefrontal cortices associated with cognitive pro-
cesses. This sequence of information processing follows laminar
patterns of connections predicted by the structural model for
cortico-cortical connections (Barbas and Rempel-Clower, 1997),
and tested empirically. In this scheme “feedforward” projections
originate from a cortical area that has more layers (or higher
neuronal density) than the site of termination. Projection neu-
rons in such a pathway originate in the upper layers and their
axons terminate in the middle layers of the receiving cortex. The
term “feedback” was originally applied to projections from a
later to an earlier processing sensory area (reviewed in Felleman
and Van Essen, 1991). In “feedback” pathways projection neu-
rons are found in the deep layers (5 and 6) and their axons
terminate mostly in layer 1. According to the structural model,
feedback pathways always originate from areas with fewer layers
(or lower neuronal density) and terminate in areas with more
layers (or higher neuronal density) than the origin. The terms
“feedforward” and “feedback” can be imported to describe con-
nections between non-sensory cortices, via analogy with sensory
systems such as the visual system (Barbas, 1986; Barbas and
Rempel-Clower, 1997).
The relational rules of the structural model allow prediction
of the possible flow of information from pOFC, which receives
information about the affective status of the environment, to
lateral prefrontal cortices, which are associated with cognitive
processes. To begin with, the amygdala innervates all layers of
pOFC, including the middle layers (Ghashghaei et al., 2007),
which receive feedforward signals. The pOFC projects to lateral
prefrontal cortices through sequential steps involving areas with
increasingly better defined laminar structure, through anterior
orbitofrontal areas and then lateral prefrontal areas, culminating
in posterior lateral prefrontal areas 46 and 8, in that order (Barbas
and Pandya, 1989). Posterior lateral areas have the best lami-
nar definition within the prefrontal cortex. Functionally they are
associated with cognitive processes. The sequential connections
follow the rules of the structural model, each stage from pOFC
onwards providing sequentially feedback projections to more dif-
ferentiated (eulaminate) cortices. These pathways suggest that
information from the pOFC reaches areas associated with cog-
nitive processes, via successive feedback projections. Physiological
data also support this pattern of information flow (e.g.,Wallis and
Miller, 2003; Bar et al., 2006). Interestingly, feedback projections,
which reach layer 1 in all areas, also reach layer 2 and the upper
part of layer 3 in most cortices, which collectively make up the
upper layers. Layer 2 in several prefrontal cortices is a major tar-
get of projections from the amygdala as well (Ghashghaei et al.,
2007).
The above linkages suggest an efficient flow of information
along sequential feedback pathways from areas with a key role in
emotions to areas associated with cognition, decision, and action.
The sensory information to the pOFC originates from high-
order sensory association areas. The projections from visual and
auditory cortices, for example, originate mostly in anterior tem-
poral cortices, which have large receptive fields and likely provide
an overview—but not high-accuracy categorizations (Freedman
et al., 2003; Freedman and Miller, 2008)—and only modest detail
of the external sensory environment (Figure 1, “Coarse”). Such a
system is suited to quick detection and transmission of coarse-
grained or “low-resolution” information, just detailed enough
to trigger actions that are imperative to the animal’s survival.
But what about situations where fine detail about the sensory
environment is necessary? Lateral prefrontal cortices are impli-
cated in detail-dependent categorizations (Freedman and Miller,
2008), and these cortices receive “high-resolution” projections,
originating from areas representing the external environment,
especially visual and auditory association cortices (reviewed in
Barbas, 2000a; Barbas et al., 2002). In contrast to pOFC, lateral
prefrontal areas 8 and 46 receive projections from awide variety of
visual cortices, including robust projections from early processing
sensory areas adjacent to the primary areas (Barbas andMesulam,
1981; Barbas, 1988; Schall et al., 1995; Figure 1, “Fine”). Early
processing visual areas may provide detailed information about
the sensory environment. Lateral prefrontal areas also project via
two or three steps to orbitofrontal cortices, innervating mostly
the middle layers in a feedforward manner. The middle layers
in most cortices include the lower part of layer 3, layer 4, and
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the upper part of layer 5. Projections from pOFC to the amyg-
dala originate overwhelmingly from the upper part of layer 5,
which receives feedforward projections from lateral prefrontal
cortices.
The laminar pattern of connections thus suggests an efficient
way to provide not only a quick overview of the environment
to pOFC, but potentially also detailed information through pro-
jections from lateral prefrontal cortices. The communication
between pOFC and lateral prefrontal cortices is important. The
posterior lateral prefrontal cortices are strategically situated in
front of the cortical premotor/motor system, poised to guide
action using information gathered about the state of the exter-
nal environment and internal environment through connections
with the orbitofrontal cortex and the amygdala (reviewed in
Barbas and Zikopoulos, 2007; Barbas et al., 2011). The pOFC has
no direct access to cortical motor control systems.
3.2. THE pOFC INNERVATES ROBUSTLY THE INHIBITORY AMYGDALAR
INTERCALATED NUCLEI IN MACAQUE MONKEYS
The discussion above shows how information from the sensory
areas is distilled for valence in the amygdala and passes on to
the prefrontal cortex (Ghashghaei and Barbas, 2002; Ghashghaei
et al., 2007; Hoistad and Barbas, 2008). We now turn to the
reciprocal pathways through which prefrontal cortices may influ-
ence the amygdala. In this regard, it is the phylogenetically old
(limbic) prefrontal cortices that reciprocate with the most robust
return projections to the amygdala (Ghashghaei and Barbas,
2002; Ghashghaei et al., 2007). The pOFC, in particular, has a
unique relationship with the amygdala, not shared with any other
cortical area: it innervates heavily the intercalated masses (IM)
of the amygdala (Ghashghaei and Barbas, 2002), which are com-
posed entirely of inhibitory neurons (Paré and Smith, 1993). In
rhesus monkeys the IM nuclei are interposed between the var-
ious basal and central nuclei of the amygdala (Figure 2). The
significance of the special pOFC pathway is based on the key
role of IM within the amygdala, through its projections to the
central nucleus (Ce), which is the chief output of the amyg-
dala to autonomic centers (reviewed in Barbas and Zikopoulos,
2006). The medial part of the central nucleus (CeM), in partic-
ular, projects to hypothalamic autonomic structures, as well as
to brainstem and spinal autonomic centers and the cholinergic
and monoaminergic systems (reviewed in Sah et al., 2003). The
output of the amygdala is in a position to either increase auto-
nomic drive, as seen in emotional arousal, or facilitate return to
autonomic homeostasis. The IM nuclei, therefore, appear to be a
focal point for the formation of flexible associations in a behav-
ioral setting. Activation of IM may heighten autonomic drive in
emotional arousal (Barbas et al., 2003; Pape and Paré, 2010).
Alternatively, IM activation may facilitate return to autonomic
homeostasis by a mechanism that is not yet clear. In rodents it
is the infralimbic (IL) cortex that innervates the inhibitory inter-
calated nuclei (ITCs). In rats the orbitofrontal cortex does not
show the extent of specialization seen in primates. The equivalent
region in rats to the primate pOFC is the IL cortex (reviewed in
Vertes, 2006), especially for its projection to the inhibitory inter-
calated neurons. In rodents, the ITC clusters (ITCs) are thought to
have a role in forming emotional associations based on behavioral
fear conditioning experiments and physiological studies (Ehrlich
et al., 2009; Busti et al., 2011). In macaque monkeys there have
been fewer physiological studies on the relevant strip of pOFC and
its relationship with the amygdala, but lesion studies suggest that
their interactions are similarly important for emotional behavior
(e.g., Kalin et al., 2007; Fox et al., 2010). The parallels between the
rat and primate circuitry provide the basis for further compar-
ison (Figure 2). The behavioral and physiological findings from
rodents and wealth of anatomical data in primates can be linked
via a computational model based on their circuit commonali-
ties. Ongoing research may also point out differences between the
circuits, and what these differences imply about generalizing the
conclusions of emotional learning studies in rodents to primates
and humans.
3.3. THE ROLE OF THE ANTERIOR CINGULATE
In the above discussion of cortico-cortical connections we have
not considered in any detail the role of the ACC in the process of
linking areas associated with emotional and cognitive processes.
Like the pOFC, the ACC is part of the prefrontal limbic system
(Vogt et al., 2005), and has strong connections with the amyg-
dala as well (Ghashghaei et al., 2007). However, it differs from
the pOFC in several ways. The ACC does not have the exquisite
focal projection to the inhibitory IM nuclei in primates, and it
lacks multimodal connections (Barbas et al., 1999) that are char-
acteristic of the pOFC. In fact, with the exception of connections
with auditory association cortices, the rest of the unimodal sen-
sory association cortices do not have significant projections to
the ACC. But the ACC has its own specializations (e.g., Buckley
et al., 2009; Pourtois et al., 2010b). Among prefrontal cortices
it has the strongest connections with the rest of the prefrontal
cortex, and is well suited to allocate attentional resources, as is
widely reported (see Medalla and Barbas, 2009, 2010; reviewed
in, Burgess et al., 2000; Paus, 2001; Rushworth et al., 2007).
In addition, the ACC receives strong monosynaptic projections
from the hippocampus, and has bidirectional connections with
medial temporal cortices (Bunce and Barbas, 2011), in pathways
that are thought to convey contextual information (reviewed in
Barbas et al., 2013). The ACC has robust connections with the
pOFC, perhaps providing the contextual information necessary to
interpret signals in the environment and contribute to emotional
arousal. Interestingly, the ACC is the primary effector to brain-
stem autonomic structures through projections to hypothalamic
and spinal autonomic centers (Ongur et al., 1998; Rempel-Clower
and Barbas, 1998; Barbas et al., 2003). These features suggest that
pOFC is the primary cortical sensor of emotional information,
whereas the ACC is the primary effector of emotional expres-
sion, linking motor control, cognition and drive (Barbas, 2000a,b;
Paus, 2001; Shackman et al., 2011).
4. EMOTIONAL LEARNING AND EXPRESSION VIA THE
AMYGDALA
Below we examine a local circuit in the amygdala implicated
in the learning and execution of a widely studied emotional
behavior: acquisition and extinction of the fear-potentiated freez-
ing response via Pavlovian conditioning (Pavlov, 1927; Maren,
2001), in which an initially neutral sensory cue (the conditioned
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FIGURE 2 | The amygdala and main extrinsic and intrinsic circuits
(A,B). Diagrams of coronal sections show key amygdalar nuclei in the
mouse (A) and macaque monkey (B). Dark red regions are the GABAergic
intercalated cells modeled here (ITCd and ITCv in mouse, and IM in
macaque), light red regions are the GABAergic CeL and CeM, and green
regions are glutamatergic nuclei. (C) Schematic depiction of the amygdalar
local circuit. The system consists of three components: (1) the cortex-like
glutamatergic basolateral sub-network (LA and BA), (2) the striatum-like
GABAergic central nucleus sub-network (CeL and CeM), and (3) the
GABAergic intercalated sub-network (ITCd and ITCv). The basolateral
sub-network receives information about CS and US via projections from
sensory cortices (CTX) and thalamus (Thal). In rodents, cortical regions IL
and PL project to the intercalated and basolateral sub-networks,
respectively. The CeM is a key output node of the network. Question
marks indicate local microcircuit details that remain to be fully
characterized experimentally. Red circles and lines represent inhibitory cell
groups and connections, and green circles and lines represent excitatory
cell groups and connections.
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stimulus, CS) such as an auditory stimulus is regularly followed by
an emotion-evoking stimulus (the unconditioned stimulus, US).
These pairings are separated by a much larger inter-trial inter-
val. The functioning of this circuit can be viewed as a form of
emotional categorization or salience-assignment. In rats this cir-
cuit receives top–down projections from medial prefrontal cortex
(IL), which modulate the behavior of the inhibitory ITCs. It is
important to note that much of the behavioral and physiolog-
ical data on fear conditioning come from rodent studies. The
degree to which the rodent circuit resembles the primate circuit is
presently unclear, but many major connections appear to be sim-
ilar across species. Diagrams of coronal brain sections in Figure 2
show the amygdala local circuit in the mouse (Figure 2A) and
the rhesus macaque (Figure 2B), depicted in schematized form
in Figure 2C. After reviewing the transmission of signals through
the amygdalar circuit, we demonstrate how computational mod-
eling of this circuit can illuminate the possible mechanisms for
top–down control of emotion. This modeling effort suggests pos-
sible functional roles for the ITCs that have not yet been explored
experimentally.
The following general principles of amygdalar organization
have been widely observed in rodents (e.g., Sah et al., 2003;
Ehrlich et al., 2009; Pape and Paré, 2010): (1) The BLA nuclei
consist of a majority of glutamatergic projection neurons and a
minority of local GABAergic interneurons, as in the cortex; (2)
the medial structures (Ce) are striatum-like, with the vast major-
ity of neurons being GABAergic, with spiny-type morphology;
(3) the internuclear projections generally follow a dorso–ventral
and latero–medial direction; (4) the ITCs add an additional layer
of complexity as recipients of projections from medial prefrontal
areas, and specifically the IL cortex in rats. In rhesus monkeys IM
neurons (the primate equivalent of ITCs; see Figure 2) receive
projections from pOFC (Ghashghaei and Barbas, 2002). While
the layout of the amygdalar circuit elements in primates is broadly
similar to that of rodents (Figure 2), the relationship among IM
neurons is not yet clear in primates.
Several recent studies of fear conditioning in rats have sug-
gested a flow of information within the amygdala as shown in
Figure 2C (reviewed in Debiac and LeDoux, 2009). Thus, LA is
seen as the input station, receiving sensory signals from thalamus
and cortex, and the central nucleus (primarily CeM) is seen as
the output station, with BA and the ITC clusters serving as inter-
mediate processing stages. Below we examine in more detail the
ITCs, which may serve as important loci for cognitive control of
emotions.
4.1. THE ROLE OF INTERCALATED NEURONS AND THEIR CORTICAL
INPUTS
The rodent ITCs have emerged as key elements in emotional
learning and expression (Ehrlich et al., 2009; Pape and Paré, 2010;
Li et al., 2011; Manko et al., 2011; Palomares-Castillo et al., 2012).
At least three anatomically distinct groups of ITCs have been
identified in rodents. Two of these groups (Figure 2) appear par-
ticularly important for fear conditioning and extinction: (1) the
dorsal group (ITCd), also called the medial paracapsular group;
and (2) the ventral group (ITCv), also called the main intercalated
nucleus. For example, Busti et al. (2011) showed that during fear
conditioning in mice, the selective activation of ITCd by LA fol-
lowing repeated CS-US pairings triggers feedforward inhibition
in ITCv, which disinhibits CeM output neurons and releases a fear
response (freezing). Conversely, extinction training, in which the
CS is repeatedly presented without a following US, leads to CS
activation of ITCv, and suppression of fear responses.
The firing properties of ITCs also suggest possible functional
roles exemplified by groups of neurons that fire at much higher
rates than commonly observed in neighboring amygdalar sites in
unanesthetized cats (Collins and Paré, 1999). Their high spon-
taneous firing rates suggest that the ITC clusters provide tonic
inhibition to their targets. The firing probabilities of ITC neurons
aremodulated by ecologically salient stimuli, such as cat growling,
dog barking, and birdsong. These findings suggest that emotion-
ally or environmentally salient stimuli can alter the firing rates of
some ITCs.
Anatomical and physiological studies implicate prefrontal pro-
jections in modulation of the inhibitory effects of ITCs. The
pOFC in primates (Ghashghaei and Barbas, 2002), and IL in
rodents (Berretta et al., 2005; Pinto and Sesack, 2008; Sierra-
Mercado et al., 2010; Sotres-Bayon and Quirk, 2010; Pinard et al.,
2012) send robust excitatory projections to the inhibitory ITCs.
Some evidence suggests that prelimbic cortex (PL) in rats and
cats may also project to ITCs. There are also well-established pro-
jections from PL (or primate ACC) to BLA and Ce. (reviewed
in Vertes, 2004). Consistent with the inhibitory role of ITCs
on amygdalar output, it has been observed that stimulation of
medial prefrontal areas in cat and rat decreases the respon-
siveness of neurons in Ce to inputs from BLA (Quirk et al.,
2003).
The projections from cortex to the ITCs also appear to have
behaviorally relevant effects on learned engagement and disen-
gagement of fear. For example, Sierra-Mercado et al. (2010) found
that in rats, inactivation of IL neurons with muscimol impaired
acquisition and retention of fear extinction, but left fear expres-
sion unchanged. Muscimol inactivation of PL had the opposite
effect: it impaired fear expression but did not disrupt extinction.
The IL (analogous to primate pOFC) was more important for
learning to engage and disengage fear, whereas PL (analogous to
primate ACC) was more important for expressing fear.
In summary, data suggest that ITC neurons play an important
role in acquisition and extinction of fear responses. Further, this
role appears to be subject to top–down modulation or control
from IL cortex in rodents and pOFC in primates. These projec-
tions can thus serve as conduits for cognitive modulation of fear
expression and suppression.
4.2. “TEACHING SIGNALS” WITHIN THE AMYGDALA
In order to model flexible learning in the local circuit outlined
above it is necessary to have plausible neural “teaching signals”
that can modify network connections in response to aversive
events. Teaching signals, as defined in theories of reinforcement
learning (reviewed in Sutton and Barto, 1998), are signals that
co-occur with salient events or prediction errors, and therefore
facilitate learning from experience. Neural signals that co-occur
with appetitive or aversive events and also facilitate synaptic plas-
ticity, such as phasic changes in firing rate or neurotransmitter
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release, are typically employed as teaching signals in neural mod-
els of reinforcement learning. The amygdala receives convergent
pathways that carry information about the CS and about the US
to the same zones, wherein associative learning processes assess
whether a particular CS is predictive of a particular US. If so,
synapses transmitting CS information gain control of emotional
responses that are typically evoked by the US. In short, infor-
mation about the US that arrives in the amygdala constitutes a
specific teaching signal for intra-amygdala learning. In the case of
learned fear, for example, important US pathways include ascend-
ing somatosensory-nociceptive pathways to amygdala (Bourgeais
et al., 2001; Lanuza et al., 2004; Johansen et al., 2010; McNally
et al., 2011). The co-occurrence of such signals with CS signals
can trigger associative learning in the amygdala, which can enable
CSs to elicit anticipatory freezing in order to avoid pain. Studies
in humans have also demonstrated expectation-related activity
in the amygdala (e.g., Sarinopoulos et al., 2006; Pourtois et al.,
2010b).
5. COMPUTATIONAL MODELING OF THE AMYGDALA
CIRCUIT
We employ computational modeling techniques to understand
how the amygdalar circuitry reviewed above can serve as the
mechanistic basis for some emotional processes, and how top–
down modulatory signals from cortex can influence these pro-
cesses. In this section we show that a computational model of
the amygdalar local circuit described above can exhibit flexi-
ble acquisition and suppression of stimulus-triggered emotion-
related responses, using classical fear conditioning as a test case.
Learning in the model can be interpreted as the categorization or
labeling of stimuli based on their affective consequences. Stimuli
that have been thus categorized can then drive fear-related behav-
ior such as the freezing response in rodents. Cortical modulation
in the model adds some flexibility, so fear-related responding is
not an inevitable consequence of presenting categorized stimuli.
Ourmodeling approach provides a simplified coarse-grained per-
spective on the amygdala local circuit: we implement rate-coding
rather than spiking in order to investigate properties of the net-
work that arise from connectivity as opposed to the physiological
parameters of particular neuronal types.
The circuit diagrams proposed in prior studies can be com-
bined into a single schematic diagram (Figure 2C) that cap-
tures the general flow of information common to many of the
anatomical and physiological studies. At least three sub-networks
can be distinguished in many of the relevant rodent studies:
(1) the BLA sub-network, an input stage consisting of exci-
tatory projection neurons and inhibitory interneurons in LA,
BL, and BM; (2) the ITC sub-network, an intermediary stage
consisting of at least two sub-populations of inhibitory cells;
and (3) the central sub-network, an output stage consisting
of inhibitory projection neurons and interneurons in CeL and
CeM. Fear-related responses appear to be expressed via excita-
tion of CeM either directly, or via disinhibition. The key external
sources of inhibition to the CeM are neurons in the ITCs and in
CeL. As reviewed above, extinction and suppression of learned
fear responses seem to involve enhancing inhibition from these
sources.
5.1. MODEL DESCRIPTION
We simulate a neural network based on the simplified amyg-
dala connectivity depicted in Figure 3. Rate-coded cell activities
representing incoming stimuli such as auditory or visual cues
project topographically to LA from the cortex (CTX). We leave
out projections from thalamus to LA, but the model would work
in similar fashion if equivalent sensory information is also con-
veyed through the thalamic projections. Cells in LA then project
topographically to a similar array in BA. Thus, for every stimu-
lus encoded in CTX there is a corresponding cell in LA and in
BA. Cells in LA converge onto a single ITCd cell. Similarly, the
array of cells in BA converges onto a single ITCv cell. The ITCd
cell inhibits ITCv and CeL. The ITCv cell inhibits CeM, the main
output station of the amygdala. This circuit is based on evidence
from rodent studies reviewed above.
Each cue (CS) can come to be associated with a negative conse-
quence such as footshock, via classical conditioning. A signal (R+)
that corresponds to the foot shock (an unconditioned stimulus;
US) arrives at three network locations, as shown (Figure 3). A sig-
nal (R−) corresponding to the non-occurrence of an expected US
arrives only at the ITCv. These two signals gate Hebbian synap-
tic change, and therefore serve as teaching signals. We will now
briefly describe the model’s performance, before demonstrating
the simulation results.
The learning process causes the potentiation of synapses on
LA cells whenever the corresponding CS co-occurs with the US
(Erlich et al., 2012). BA cells in turn are potentiated whenever
LA activities co-occur with the US. Synapses onto the ITCd
cell are potentiated whenever LA activity overlaps with the US.
Similarly, synapses onto the ITCv cell are potentiated when-
ever BA activity overlaps with the absence of an expected US.
Depression of synaptic weights onto the ITC cells occurs when-
ever the conditions for their potentiation are not met. Weights
onto the ITCd cell decrease when the CS-US pairing is extin-
guished, whereas weights onto the ITCv cell follow the opposite
pattern: when CS-US pairing is extinguished, the weights of
synapses from BA onto ITCv increase, allowing ITCv to suppress
previously learned fear responding. Over time, the activities of
LA and BA cells co-occur with those CSs that have been paired
with the US. Learning is modeled phenomenologically—this
captures empirically established rules regarding the experience-
dependence of long-term potentiation (LTP) and long-term
depression (LTD) at selected amygdalar synapses. (See Methods
section for a brief description of our phenomenological modeling
approach).
Synaptic depression is assumed to be much faster in the ITC
clusters than in LA and BA. Direct evidence for this assumption
is not yet available, but physiological findings on ITCs are con-
sistent with it (Pape and Paré, 2010; Busti et al., 2011; Manko
et al., 2011). Weights onto cells in LA and BA, once potenti-
ated, are assumed to decay only negligibly over the time scales
simulated. The difference in decay rate allows for flexibility in
the face of changing contingencies without erasure of previously
learned CS-US associations. In the model, weights of synapses
onto ITCd and ITCv cells change rapidly, allowing the system to
switch from a response mode to a response-suppression mode,
without necessitating unlearning at the level of LA or BA. Thus,
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FIGURE 3 | A simplified amygdala circuit for emotional responding.
An array of stimulus-related excitatory outputs from a cortical network
(CTX) projects in a topographic manner to the lateral nucleus of the
amygdala (LA). The cortical network (top inset) is constructed as a
distance-dependent on-center off-surround network. Amygdalar input
station LA sends excitatory projections topographically to the basal nucleus
of the amygdala (BA). Thus, for every cortical cell there is a corresponding
cell in LA and in BA, and a corresponding weight from LA onto the
inhibitory dorsal intercalated cell (ITCd) and from BA onto the inhibitory
ventral intercalated cell (ITCv). The whole array of excitatory LA cells
converges onto one ITCd cell. Similarly the array of excitatory BA cells
converges onto one ITCv cell, and one cell of the central nucleus of the
amygdala (CeM). The ITCd cell inhibits the ITCv cell. The ITCv cell inhibits
the CeM cell. The ITCd and ITCv cells each receive projections from
infralimbic cortex (IL). Green arrows represent excitatory glutamatergic
projections. Red flat arrows represent inhibitory GABAergic projections.
Blue ovals represent modifiable synaptic weights. The filled blue ovals
represent weights that are potentiated by the arrival of the US (R+). The
empty blue oval represents weights that are potentiated by the arrival of a
US prediction-error signal (R−).
the synapses onto LA and BA allow for post-extinction savings,
whereas synapses onto the ITCs allow for sensitivity to changes in
contingency.
The basic performance of the model is as follows (Figure 4):
after fear acquisition, weights on LA, BA, and ITCd are poten-
tiated, leading to inhibition of ITCv, and excitation of CeM, the
output cell of the network that triggers the fear response. After
fear extinction, weights on LA and BA are almost unchanged,
but the weights on ITCd have decreased, and weights on ITCv
have increased, causing CeM to be inhibited and the fear response
to be suppressed. Simulation results also show some degree of
redundancy in the ITCd and ITCv synapses. In some situations
this apparent redundancy may be unmasked, so the two areas
can serve distinct functions. Simulations also reveal a possible
information-processing role for the ITCs.
Cortical modulation from IL onto ITCd and ITCv can be used
to bias the circuit’s behavior toward or away from extinction. IL
can be used to enhance the activity of ITCd, thereby increas-
ing inhibition of ITCv and leading to greater disinihibition of
CeM. Alternatively, IL can be used to enhance the activity of
ITCv, increasing inhibition onto CeM. The IL (pOFC in primates)
is thus well placed to bias the information-processing role of
the ITCs.
The cortical network (CTX) is structured as a distance-
dependent on-center- off-surround shunting network. Networks
of this type offer a simple, neurally plausiblemeans of implement-
ing contrast-enhancement, as well as a host of other processes
(Grossberg, 1973). The strength of the off-surround inhibition
can be varied to determine how sharply the cell activities represent
a set of incoming stimuli. In other words, controlling inhibition
modulates the tuning curve of each cell. Strong inhibition allows
for sharp contrast, whereas weak inhibition leads to spreading
activity and lower contrast. This can serve as a simple model of
top–down attention. High attention corresponds to sharp tuning
or high contrast, whereas low attention can lead to broader tun-
ing or lower contrast. Low contrast can be used to make “fuzzy”
representations that can be used as a basis for generalization of
stimuli. In the case of fear conditioning, the amygdala circuit
can be interpreted as categorizing stimuli as either predictive or
non-predictive of an aversive US. High contrast in the CTX will
allow the system to accurately respond only to the CSs paired with
the US. But the system will not generalize to CSs that have not
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FIGURE 4 | Summary of basic model behavior. Line thickness denotes
strength of activity. Left: The state of the network after fear acquisition. ITCd
inhibits the ITCv, thereby disinhibiting CeM, allowing BA to excite it. CeM
excitation leads to fear responding. Right: The state of the network after
extinction. ITCv inhibits CeM, so CeM becomes insensitive to BA excitation.
Note that the learning at LA and BA synapses is not lost. CeM inhibition
suppresses fear responding. See caption of Figure 3 for key to symbols and
a description of the circuit.
been presented. For instance, if a sound of a particular frequency
is paired with footshock, then a range of similar frequencies will
also elicit a fear response. In situations of generalization, the range
that is determined to be similar is widened, so more frequen-
cies come to elicit the fear response. Thus, modulating inhibition
in the CTX provides a way to investigate the effects of attention
or stimulus tuning on fear learning. Some studies of generaliza-
tion during fear conditioning implicate hippocampal dysfunction
(reviewed in Kheirbek et al., 2012). It may be that an analogous
mechanism to the cortical one posited here may be applied to
hippocampus-dependent changes in generalization.
5.2. SIMULATION RESULTS
The circuit in Figure 3 has many degrees of freedom. Here we
focus on the possible roles of the ITC masses ITCd and ITCv in
emotional learning. The only weights that are subject to synap-
tic change are the weights from the cortex to LA, from LA to BA,
from LA to ITCd, and from BA to ITCv. All other weights are held
constant.
In these results, we ignore the projection from CeL to CeM in
order to focus on the inhibitory action of ITCv on CeM. As the
network diagram suggests (Figure 2), there is redundancy in the
inhibitory pathways to CeM. Simulations (not shown) confirm
the idea that CeL and ITCv have very similar roles in the simpli-
fied circuit shown in Figure 3. For simplicity we omit the activity
of CeL in the results that follow. A more detailed model incor-
porating additional connections will be necessary to investigate
asymmetrical roles for each source of inhibition to CeM.
5.2.1. Fear-related learning
The basic behavior of the model is illustrated schematically in
Figure 4. The model is taken through four consecutive learning
epochs: (1) fear acquisition, (2) fear extinction, (3) fear retrieval
(the post-extinction re-engagement of fear responding), and (4)
extinction retrieval (the re-engagement of fear extinction). The
CTX network receives two CSs with overlapping representa-
tions, i.e., the two CSs activate a common subset of cells in
the CTX array. For instance, two auditory signals with over-
lapping frequencies, represented in a tonotopic manner, can
be used as the CSs. The two CSs are presented in alterna-
tion, and while on, each co-occurs with the US (R+) during
epochs 1 and 3. The prediction-error signal (R−) takes non-zero
values in epochs 2 and 4. The time course of model cell activ-
ities is shown in Figure 5. The red plots in E–G indicate R+
(the US), and the green lines in E–G indicate absence of R+,
or extinction trials. When the CS is shut off (Ei = 0), a trial
ends, and the activities are reset to zero. Only the connection
weights persist through the intertrial intervals. The correspond-
ing time course of changes to connection weights is shown in
Figure 6.
The key development during acquisition is the learning of the
CS-US association by the weights onto LA and BA. Once these
associations have been formed, they are not significantly weak-
ened during extinction epochs, as is apparent in Figures 6A and
6B, though the modeled synapses can undergo both LTP and LTD
at a slow rate.
5.2.2. Using frontal cortex to bias the system
Tonic excitation from cortex (ILd and ILv) to ITCd and ITCv
can be used to bias the output of the circuit, i.e., the activ-
ity of CeM. For example, if the net excitatory input to ITCd is
above a certain threshold, the system is no longer able to extin-
guish previously learned fear responding (Figure 7-I). The system
has effectively been placed in a “cautious” mode, so during an
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FIGURE 5 | Time course of model cell activities during “normal”
mode. The system exhibits fear acquisition, extinction, fear retrieval, and
extinction retrieval. Plots show the time evolution of model cell activities
during four consecutive epochs. Each plot (A–D) shows the temporal
evolution of an array of 20 cells, with the y-axis representing the cell
index, and the color representing strength of activation (Blue is low, red
is high). At any given time there is either a CS1-US pairing, a CS2-US
pairing, a presentation of CS1 alone, a presentation of CS2 alone, or an
intertrial interval. Because the features of CS1 and CS2 overlap, the
indices of activation bars for corresponding representations in (A–D) also
overlap. Each plot (E–G) shows the temporal evolution of a single cell,
with the y-axis representing strength of activation of that cell. In the first
and third epochs, the CS signals, shown in (A), co-occur with R+, the
US. In the second and fourth epochs, the CS signals are presented
without R+. The red dotted lines in (E–G) indicate presence of R+. The
green lines indicate extinction epochs in which R+ = 0. (Parameters:
strength of inhibition fI = 3.0; input from IL to ITCd EILd = 0; input from
IL to ITCv EILv = 2).
extinction epoch the system does not suppress the fear-related
responses to associations that were formed during the preceding
acquisition epoch. Similar results are obtained when the input
to ITCv sinks below a threshold. These effects occur due to the
inhibitory effect of ITCd on ITCv. If ITCv cannot be driven by
cells in BA, it cannot suppress previously learned fear respond-
ing. In other words, in configurations of this type, the system is
insensitive to weakening of the link between CSs and the aversive
US. In a “cautious” mode, the system does not let down its guard,
and continues to generate fear-related responses to CSs long after
they cease to co-occur with the US.
Conversely, if excitatory signal EILv from ILv to ITCv is high
and signal EILd from ILd to ITCd is low, the system rapidly
switches from fear responding to no response after fewer extinc-
tion trials (Figure 7-II). The system has effectively been placed
in a “rapid switch” mode, so during an extinction epoch it can
more quickly learn to suppress fear-related responses. These sim-
ulations agree with experimental results showing the importance
of the ITCs in fear learning and expression. The cortical control of
the ITCs may be an important route for top–down cognitive con-
trol of emotional learning and behavior, adding additional flex-
ibility to responses that are often considered automatic. Further,
because the inputs from ILd and ILv can take continuous values,
the system’s rate of extinction of fear-related responses—or, con-
versely, its degree of “caution”—can be smoothly varied between
the two extreme states.
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FIGURE 6 | Time evolution of model synaptic weights during “normal”
mode. The system exhibits fear acquisition, extinction, fear retrieval, and
extinction retrieval. Plots show the time evolution of model connection
weights during four consecutive epochs. Each plot (A–D) shows the temporal
evolution of an array of 20 connection weights, with the y-axis representing
the index of the corresponding cell, and the color representing connection
strength (Blue is low, red is high). In the first and third epochs, the CS signals
co-occur with R+, the US. In the second and fourth epochs, the CS signals
are presented without R+. (Parameters: strength of inhibition fI = 3.0; input
from IL to ITCd EILd = 0; input from IL to ITCv EILv = 2).
5.2.3. Redundant learning
An important question that arises when modeling a given cir-
cuit is whether all the network’s dynamic processes are required
to produce the same qualitative output, or if a subset will suf-
fice. In some circumstances the weights onto ITCv appear to
encode redundant information. The apparent redundancy can
be demonstrated by turning off learning in the ITCv and ITCd
weights one by one. In Figure 8-I there is no learning in the LA-
ITCd weights, so the amplitude of the CeM response is weakened,
resulting in failure to acquire an appreciable fear response to CS
presentation. In Figure 8-II there is no learning in the BA-ITCv
weights, and the CeM response is normal during acquisition tri-
als. During extinction epochs there is some reduction in the CeM
reponse, but it is partial. Thus, the learning at BA-ITCv synapses
may appear redundant, as a reduction in CeM response amplitude
can be achieved without it.
However, the apparent redundancy of learning at the weights
onto ITCv is unmasked in other circumstances. To demonstrate
this, we modify the fear extinction paradigm. In the next set
of simulations, only one of the two overlapping CS signals is
extinguished. A subset of cells in CTX, LA and BA are there-
fore activated during both CS presentations, due to the afore-
mentioned overlap. For example, let CS1 be an auditory signal
containing frequencies from 500 to 1500Hz, and let CS2 be a sig-
nal containing frequencies from 1000 to 2000Hz. The two CSs
overlap in the range from 1000 to 1500Hz. During the extinction
epochs, the cells in LA and BA that are activated during both CS
presentations are subject to conflicting affective outcomes—they
co-occur with both the US (R+) and its unexpected absense (R−).
The cells in the amygdala circuit representing the range of over-
lap convey ambiguous information to the CeM cell. We therefore
describe the situation as one of “confusing outcomes.” Thus, dur-
ing extinction epochs the weights from LA onto ITCd and from
BA onto ITCv that correspond to these overlapping cells in LA
and BA take on fluctuating, intermediate values. These weights
are alternately increased and decreased by the US and its absense,
respectively. Because of these intermediate weight values, during
extinction epochs the activities of ITCd and ITCv do not clearly
distinguish the extinguished CS from the non-extinguished CS.
This can be seen in the simulation results. In Figures 9-II-A and
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FIGURE 7 | (I) Time evolution of model cell activities during “cautious”
mode (when ITCd activation is much higher than ITCv activation): the
system is biased to prevent extinction. (Parameters: strength of inhibition
fI = 3.0; input from IL to ITCd EILd = 5; input from IL to ITCv EILv = 2).
(II) Time evolution of model cell activities during “rapid switch” mode
(when ITCv activation is much higher than ITCd activation): the system is
biased to enhance extinction. (Parameters: strength of inhibition fI = 3.0;
input from IL to ITCd EILd = 0; input from IL to ITCv EILv = 5). Each plot
shows the temporal evolution of a single cell over four consecutive
epochs, with the y-axis representing strength of activation. In the first and
third epochs, the CS signals, co-occur with R+, the US. In the second and
fourth epochs, the CS signals are presented without R+. The red dotted
lines indicate presence of R+. The green lines indicate extinction epochs in
which R+ = 0.
III-A, the ITCd activity takes non-zero values during presenta-
tion of both the extinguished CS and the non-extinguished CS.
In Figures 9-I-B and III-B, the ITCv activity takes non-zero val-
ues during presentation of both the extinguished CS and the
non-extinguished CS.
In Figure 9-I there is no learning in the LA-ITCd weights.
Once again we see weaker magnitude CeM responses. In
Figure 9-II there is no learning in the BA-ITCv weights, but here
we see that fear responding to the second CS signal has not been
extinguished at all. In Figure 9-III learning occurs in both sets of
weights, and we see correct extinction learning, along with higher
magnitude CeM activity. The activities of ITCv and ITCd—which
are each ambiguous on their own—act synergistically to improve
the performance of the system.
These results suggest the possibility that ITCd and ITCv—
and by extension, their cortical inputs—play roles in contrast-
enhancement, or in modifying the system’s effective signal-to-
noise ratio. In other words, the fear enhancing or suppressing
roles of ITCd and ITCv might not function purely as on-off
switches, but may also supplement the signal processing and
filtering steps that occur at prior stages in the circuit.
5.2.4. Attention and generalization
As described above, in certain configurations the CTX net-
work may be unable to form a sharp representation of the CS.
There may be contexts in which top–down attentional resources
are overtaxed or spread too thinly. We model this low atten-
tion as weakened inhibition in the competitive-cooperative CTX
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FIGURE 8 | Time evolution of model cell activities. (I) No learning
occurs at the LA-ITCd synapses. (II) No learning occurs at the BA-ITCv
synapses. Each plot shows the temporal evolution of a single cell over four
consecutive epochs, with the y-axis representing strength of activation. In
the first and third epochs, the CS signals, shown in (A), co-occur with R+,
the US. In the second and fourth epochs, one of the CS signals is
presented without R+. The red dotted lines indicate presence of R+. The
green lines indicate extinction epochs in which R+ = 0. (Parameters:
strength of inhibition fI = 3.0; input from IL to ITCd EILd = 0; input from IL
to ITCv EILv = 2).
network, leading to a spreading of activity, which in turn leads
to spurious associations of the US with CSs that were not
presented. If the outcomes are not “confusing,” learning can
appear normal (Figures 10, 11). But if the outcomes are “con-
fusing,” the system cannot extinguish learning, even if ILd is
used to drive ITCd and put the network in “cautious” mode
(Figure 12). Low attention prevents the system from discriminat-
ing between threatening and non-threatening stimuli, because the
two have been categorized as the same via a process analogous to
generalization.
6. DISCUSSION
6.1. IMPLICATIONS OF THE SIMPLIFIED MODEL
The simplified circuit model demonstrates some of the key emo-
tional processes the rodent amygdala subserves—fear learning,
extinction, and extinction retrieval. The model simulations
demonstrate that if learning in the intercalated masses (ITCd and
ITCv) is faster than in the BL complex (LA and BA), the system
can rapidly switch between fear responding and extinction with-
out discarding the CS-US associations in LA and BA. Cortical
modulation from IL can be used to bias the system toward either a
“rapid switch” mode or a “cautious”mode. Also, learning in ITCd
and ITCv sometimes seems redundant, but in situations involving
conflicting outcomes, these two regions may cooperate to dis-
ambiguate the incoming signal, prior to the final output stage
of the amygdala. This synergy between ITCd and ITCv enhances
the performance of the system in “confusing” situations, serving
effectively as a form of information-processing. Cognitive control
over the intercalated cells (ITCs in rodents, IM in primates) via
IL/pOFC projections may serve as a mechanism to flexibly modify
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FIGURE 9 | Time evolution of model cell activities during “confusing”
outcomes. Only one of the two overlapping CS signals is extinguished.
(I) No learning occurs at the LA-ITCd synapses. (II) No learning occurs at
the BA-ITCv synapses. (III) Learning occurs in both LA-ITCd and BA-ITCd
weights. Each plot shows the temporal evolution of a single cell over four
consecutive epochs, with the y-axis representing strength of activation. In
the first and third epochs, the CS signals, shown in (A), co-occur with R+,
the US. In the second and fourth epochs, one of the CS signals is
presented without R+. The red dotted lines indicate presence of R+. The
green lines indicate extinction epochs in which R+ = 0. (Parameters:
strength of inhibition fI = 3.0; input from IL to ITCd EILd = 0; input from IL
to ITCv EILv = 2).
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FIGURE 10 | Time evolution of model cell activities during
“generalization” mode. Both CS signals are extinguished. Plots show
the time evolution of model cell activities during four consecutive
epochs. Each plot (A–D) shows the temporal evolution of an array of
20 cells, with the y-axis representing the cell index, and the color
representing strength of activation (Blue is low, red is high). Each plot
(E–G) shows the temporal evolution of a single cell, with the y-axis
representing strength of activation of that cell. In the first and third
epochs, the CS signals co-occur with R+, the US. In the second and
fourth epochs, the CS signals are presented without R+. (Parameters:
strength of inhibition fI = 0.3; input from IL to ITCd EILd = 0; input
from IL to ITCv EILv = 2).
behavioral strategies in response to environmental contingencies.
For instance, environments containing a mixture of appetitive
and aversive stimuli may necessitate the “rapid switch” mode, so
that the organism is brave enough to discover useful resources
without being so foolhardy as to ignore threats. Extremely danger-
ous environments, on the other hand, may require the “cautious”
mode, and an attenuation of exploratory behavior. Environments
that are “confusing,” containing stimuli that are hard to distin-
guish, or whose affective consequences change over time, may
require cortical or hippocampal (e.g., Frankland et al., 1998)
enhancement of the information-processing abilities of the inter-
calated cells. The model demonstrates in simplified form how
the amygdala and IL/pOFC can flexibly readjust fear responses
as contingencies change—such roles have also been inferred from
human fMRI research (Schiller et al., 2008).
The model also allows us to demonstrate that weakened
top–down attention can prevent the system from discriminat-
ing between threatening and non-threatening stimuli. This occurs
via a process of over-generalization, in which two stimuli can-
not be separated on the basis of their affective consequences.
Though we posit that this over-generalization occurs as a result
of cortical mechanisms, the basic process may also be applied
to model the pathological over-generalizations that have been
attributed to hippocampal dysfunction (reviewed in Kheirbek
et al., 2012). Pathological over-generalization may also have a
basis within the amygdalar circuit (Mahan and Ressler, 2012).
Patients diagnosed with PTSD display over-generalization (e.g.,
Lissek and Grillon, 2010), and this could result from the kind
of attentional dysfunction employed in the model. But it is pre-
mature to extrapolate from our simplified model to complex
human psychological phenomena. Nevertheless, the modeling
results can be used to guide hypotheses to be explored further in
experimental animals and humans. For instance, medical inter-
ventions that enhance attention may allow patients with PTSD
to better discriminate between threatening and non-threatening
stimuli.
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FIGURE 11 | Time evolution of model synaptic weights during
“generalization” mode. Both CS signals are extinguished, but weights
corresponding to stimuli that were never presented are also increased. Each
plot (A–D) shows the temporal evolution of an array of 20 connection
weights, with the y-axis representing the index of the corresponding cell, and
the color representing connection strength (Blue is low, red is high). In the
first and third epochs, the CS signals co-occur with R+, the US. In the second
and fourth epochs, one of the CS signals is presented without R+.
(Parameters: strength of inhibition fI = 0.3; input from IL to ITCd EILd = 0;
input from IL to ITCv EILv = 2).
The modeling results show that learning in a simplified sub-
set of the possible amygdalar network connections is sufficient
to exhibit flexible emotional learning. More complex tasks will
be necessary to resolve the roles of seemingly redundant connec-
tions or representations in the network. Future anatomical and
physiological studies will allow us to make more specific claims
about the nature and location of synaptic changes, and also about
the neurochemical signals that are necessary for these changes to
occur.
More generally, the approach here shows that simple simula-
tions of a neural circuit constructed from the bottom up not only
agree with experimental findings, but also suggest and predict
novel roles for network elements that go beyond straightforward
extrapolations from experiment. For instance, the model simula-
tions point to possible information-processing roles for the ITCs.
The model suggests that these cells are not simply on-off switches
for the fear response, but can act synergistically to enhance the
model’s ability to discriminate between stimuli in situations that
are confusing. Further, since the ITCs receive projections from
prefrontal cortex, they may be part of a circuit for top–down
effects on emotional expression and suppression. These results are
consistent with an earlier biophysical modeling study by Li et al.
(2011), which shows that IL can overcome inter-ITC inhibition to
control CeM output. That study is the only other computational
model that explicitly incorporates the ITCs. As we have done here,
Li et al. (2011) also omitted the effects of CeL due to paucity
of data.
Another comparable computational model is that of Krasne
et al. (2011). Their amygdalar model is also rate-coded and
incorporates learning, but has a complementary focus—one
of their central modeling targets is an extensive exploration
of hippocampus-dependent contextual fear conditioning. Our
model does not incorporate hippocampal connections, but
uniquely highlights the possible effects of IL projections to ITCs.
The model of Krasne et al. (2011) posits that extinction takes
place via interneurons in BLA, whereas we propose that extinc-
tion occurs due to learning at the ITCs. Their computational
approach also differs: their implementation can be described as
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FIGURE 12 | Time evolution of model cell activities during “phobic”
mode. Only one of the two overlapping CS signals is extinguished. Each
plot (A–C) shows the temporal evolution of a single cell over four
consecutive epochs, with the y-axis representing strength of activation. In
the first and third epochs, the CS signals, shown in (A), co-occur with R+,
the US. In the second and fourth epochs, one of the CS signals is
presented without R+. The red dotted lines indicate presence of R+. The
green lines indicate extinction epochs in which R+ = 0. (Parameters:
strength of inhibition fI = 0.3; input from IL to ITCd EILd = 0; input from IL
to ITCv EILv = 2).
algorithmic and algebraic, whereas ours is based on dynamical
systems.
Thus, we show that a rate-coded model can corroborate and
extend insights gained from more fine-grained biophysical spik-
ing models such as that of Li et al. (2011), and can also com-
plement other higher-level approaches such as that of Krasne
et al. (2011). Simplified models such as ours also have the ben-
efit of greater computational tractability than biophysical models,
allowing for rapid investigation of qualitative circuit-level phe-
nomena. Further, our model is the only one we are aware of
to incorporate synaptic learning at the ITCs. The information-
processing role predicted by our model may be linked with the
integrative roles for ITCs proposed by Palomares-Castillo et al.
(2012).
Our model shows how the amygdalar local circuit depicted
in Figure 3 can assign emotional significance to stimuli and use
these categorized stimuli to drive emotional behavior such as the
freezing response. The model is based on circuits described in
rodents, in which behavioral and physiological data are avail-
able. As discussed above, in rhesus monkeys the principal path-
way from the cortex to IM (the primate equivalent to rodent
ITCs) originates in pOFC (Ghashghaei and Barbas, 2002). In
rhesus monkeys IM neurons are not segregated into dorsal
and ventral clusters, but belong to at least three neurochemical
classes of inhibitory neurons which are intermingled within IM
(Zikopoulos and Barbas, 2011). The distinct classes of inhibitory
neurons may have critical, and perhaps specific, roles in emo-
tional arousal and return to autonomic homeostasis.
6.2. FUTURE DIRECTIONS: EXTENDING THE MODEL
Ongoing work will incorporate more of the local amygdalar cir-
cuit connections, and embed the amygdala more fully into the
cognitive-emotional continuum we described earlier. We aim to
progressively expand the computational model, so that it can tie
together more of the experimental data, display more diverse,
flexible behaviors, and suggest neural accounts of psychiatric
disorders that can inform translational research.
In order to form a more nuanced picture of the relation-
ship between emotion and attention, it is necessary to address
the fact that attention-related neural mechanisms can both affect
the amygdalar circuit and be affected by amygdalar outputs. In
keeping with this goal we hope to include in future iterations of
the model the recently discovered projections from amygdala to
the thalamic reticular nucleus (TRN) (Zikopoulos and Barbas,
2012). Thalamic processing for the suppression of irrelevant stim-
uli is crucial for selective attention, and may be accomplished
early in neural processing through the inhibitory TRN. The
TRN lies between the thalamus and cortex and plays a key role
in processes that direct attention to relevant/significant stimuli
(Figure 1). The TRN receives projections from all cerebral cor-
tices and their associated thalamic nuclei, but sends inhibitory
output only to the thalamus, effectively gating thalamo-cortical
communication (Crick, 1984; Montero, 1997; Weese et al., 1999;
Pinault, 2004; McAlonan et al., 2008; Petrof and Brown, 2010).
Projections from sensory and motor cortices and their thala-
mic nuclei map topographically on TRN (reviewed in Guillery
and Harting, 2003; Pinault, 2004; Zikopoulos and Barbas, 2007).
In primates, prefrontal cortices innervate the anterior sector
of TRN (Zikopoulos and Barbas, 2006). However, lateral pre-
frontal cortex (areas 46 and 9) and pOFC, which are major
sensory-recipient prefrontal regions, and their associated thala-
mic nucleus, the mediodorsal (MD), have widespread projections
that extend beyond the frontal sector of TRN to sites innervated
by sensory and motor cortices (Zikopoulos and Barbas, 2006).
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Through this unique type of projection, lateral prefrontal and
posterior orbitofrontal cortices may control the passage of signals
through the thalamus to shift attention to relevant stimuli and
suppress distracters (Barbas and Zikopoulos, 2007). The amyg-
dala may be in a position to modulate this attentional mechanism
via a novel and robust excitatory pathway from the basal amyg-
dala that also innervates widely the inhibitory TRN in rhesus
monkeys (Zikopoulos and Barbas, 2012). This pathway innervates
the entire antero–posterior axis of TRN, and converges at sites
that receive widespread projections from MD, pOFC and lateral
prefrontal cortices. An additional distinguishing feature of this
amygdalar pathway is the presence of large and efficient synapses
that target TRN neurons proximally. This unique and widespread
pattern of connectivity suggests that this system is suited for
an overseeing role in events that require heightened attention
to stimuli that are essential for survival, or simply for rapid
attention to salient stimuli to make a judgment for a course of
action.
Attentional and emotional processes are also linked via the
widely projecting neurotransmitter systems (relevant human
studies are reviewed in Davis and Whalen, 2001). For instance,
the cholinergic projection system in the basal forebrain, which
includes the nucleus basalis ofMeynert (NBM) and the substantia
innominata (SI), may play an important role in the interactions
between the amygdala and the prefrontal cortex. The amygdalar
central nucleus (Ce) and the IM (ITCs in rodents) project to the
basal forebrain (Paré and Smith, 1994; Bourgeais et al., 2001).
These cholinergic pathways from the basal forebrain may have
widespread effects on the entire cortex, and may affect general
vigilance through tonic signals, or enhance attention through
phasic activity (Davis and Whalen, 2001; Sarter and Parikh, 2005;
Parikh and Sarter, 2008). Among prefrontal cortices the ACC and
the pOFC receive the strongest cholinergic projections from the
basal forebrain (Mesulam et al., 1992; Ghashghaei and Barbas,
2001).
It has long been established that both emotional salience and
direct stimulation in the amygdala promote memory formation
(McGaugh, 2004; Chau and Galvez, 2012), a process which may
involve the substantial projections from midbrain dopaminergic
areas to amygdalar nuclei (Björklund and Dunnett, 2007; Cho
and Fudge, 2010). Dopaminergic signals can serve as teaching
signals that affect synaptic plasticity and memory, often in con-
junction with other neurotransmitters (Nader and LeDoux, 1999;
LaLumiere et al., 2004). More recent studies have established that
DA is necessary for normal learning of cued fear responses, and
that an absence of normal DA signaling during fear conditioning
instead leads to the development of generalized anxiety (Zweifel
et al., 2011).
In summary, incorporating the TRN and the neurotransmitter
systems may allow us to expand our simplified attentional mecha-
nism, and also investigate teaching signals and synaptic plasticity,
both within the amygdala and in regions affected directly and
indirectly by amygdalar output. These pathways to and from the
amygdalamay be well suited to serve as the basis of amore general
phenomenon of emotional “perception” (Vuilleumier et al., 2004;
Hadj-Bouziane et al., 2008; Lim et al., 2009; reviewed in, Barrett
and Bar, 2009).
7. CONCLUSION
We have argued that rather than being opposing forces, cogni-
tion, and emotion can be seen as points on a continuum or
gradient of flexible processes required for adaptive categorization
of, and response to, changes in the external and internal envi-
ronment of an organism. While this conceptualization may not
capture all the psychological nuances of the terms, it highlights
the experimentally tractable facets of “cognition” and “emotion.”
The functional continuum is based on the robust connections
between areas associated with cognition and those associated with
emotion. The amygdala and the pOFC receive coarse-grained
information from a variety of brain regions, and are both in a
position to integrate internal and external environmental signals
into broad emotion-related representations of stimuli and overall
context. The pOFC sends “feedback” projections to lateral pre-
frontal cortices, which are associated with cognition, and receive
fine-grained sensory information. Compared with pOFC, lateral
prefrontal cortices may thus form more precise representations
of the environment. Such representations can then be sent via
“feedforward” projections to areas associated with emotions and
goal-directed behavior (pOFC), from which they can influence
internal states and behavior through specialized projections to the
amygdala.
Our simplified computational model illustrates one way
that the amygdala can carry out emotional categorization and
response-generation. The model also shows how the prefrontal
cortex, acting via the intercalated cell groups, can modulate
learned fear responding, and facilitate flexible switching between
fear expression and suppression without loss of prior learn-
ing. The prefrontal cortical projections can put the system in
a “cautious” mode in which fear cannot be suppressed, or in a
“rapid-switch” mode in which extinction is sped up. “Reducing”
the level of attention in the model provides a mechanism by
which the system can generalize the consequences of a stimulus,
or enter into a “phobic” mode that is resistant to extinction. In
future studies attentional modulations may be incorporated into
the model by adding the known projections of amygdala to TRN
and the neuromodulatory systems. Thus, emotional categoriza-
tion of stimuli that arrive at the amygdalar circuit not only drives
responses, but can also lead to widespread changes in high-level
cortical processing.
In conclusion, the model demonstrates how a computational
approach can suggest non-trivial functional roles of network
components. Among these, the model simulations reveal an
information-processing role for intercalated neurons in learning
emotional associations and flexibly altering expectations when
stimuli no longer signal a threat (or lack of reward) in the envi-
ronment. The computational model based on key nodes in the
amygdalar circuit also provides a plausible mechanism for the
generalization of stimuli, which may underlie the pattern of acti-
vation in the amygdalar-prefrontal circuit in a variety of anxiety
disorders including phobias and PTSD.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This work was supported by CELEST, the Center of
Excellence for Learning in Education, Science, and Technology
(a National Science Foundation Science of Learning Center,
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org April 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 101 | 20
John et al. Modeling flexible learning in amygdala
grant SBE-0354378) and the National Institutes of Health
(National Institute of Mental Health RO1MH057414, and
the National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke,
R01NS024760). Preliminary results were presented at the Society
for Neurosciences meeting in New Orleans, 2012.
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
Yohan J. John, Daniel Bullock, Basilis Zikopoulos, and Helen
Barbas designed the circuit model. Yohan J. John performed and
analyzed the simulations. Yohan J. John, Daniel Bullock, Basilis
Zikopoulos, and Helen Barbas prepared the manuscript.
REFERENCES
Bach, D. R., Weiskopf, N., and Dolan,
R. J. (2011). A stable sparse fear
memory trace in human amygdala.
J. Neurosci. 31, 9383–9389.
Bao, S., Chan, V., and Merzenich,
M. (2001). Cortical remodelling
induced by activity of ventral
tegmental dopamine neurons.
Nature 412, 79–83.
Bar, M., Kassam, K., Ghuman, A.,
Boshyan, J., Schmid, A., Dale, A.,
et al. (2006). Top-down facilitation
of visual recognition. Proc. Natl.
Acad. Sci. U. S. A. 103, 449–454.
Barbas, H. (1986). Pattern in the lam-
inar origin of corticocortical con-
nections. J. Comp. Neurol. 252,
415–422. 308.
Barbas, H. (1988). Anatomic organiza-
tion of basoventral and mediodorsal
visual recipient prefrontal regions in
the rhesus monkey. J. Comp. Neurol.
276, 313–342.
Barbas, H. (1993). Organization of cor-
tical afferent input to orbitofrontal
areas in the rhesus monkey.
Neuroscience 56, 841–864.
Barbas, H. (1995). Anatomic basis
of cognitive-emotional interac-
tions in the primate prefrontal
cortex. Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev. 19,
499–510.
Barbas, H. (2000a). Complementary
role of prefrontal cortical regions in
cognition, memory and emotion in
primates. Adv. Neurol. 84, 87–110.
Barbas, H. (2000b). Connections
underlying the synthesis of cogni-
tion, memory, and emotion in pri-
mate prefrontal cortices. Brain Res.
Bull. 52, 319–330.
Barbas, H. (2007). Flow of information
for emotions through temporal and
orbitofrontal pathways. J. Anat. 211,
237–249. 11913.
Barbas, H., Bunce, J., and Medalla, M.
(2013). “Prefrontal pathways that
control attention,” in Principles of
Frontal Lobe Functions 2nd Edn. eds
D. T. Stuss and R. T. Knight (New
York, NY: Oxford University Press),
31–48.
Barbas, H., and De Olmos, J. (1990).
Projections from the amygdala to
basoventral and mediodorsal pre-
frontal regions in the rhesus mon-
key. J. Comp. Neurol. 300, 549–571.
Barbas, H., Ghashghaei, H.,
Dombrowski, S. M., and Rempel-
Clower, N. L. (1999). Medial
prefrontal cortices are unified by
common connections with superior
temporal cortices and distinguished
by input from memory-related
areas in the rhesus monkey. J.
Compa. Neurol. 410, 343–367.
Barbas, H., Ghashghaei, H., Rempel-
Clower, N., and Xiao, D. (2002).
“Anatomic basis of functional
specialization in prefrontal cor-
tices in primates,” in Handbook
of Neuropsychology, Vol. 7: The
Frontal Lobes, ed J. Grafman Vol. 2
(Amsterdam: Elsevier Science B.V.),
1–27.
Barbas, H., and Mesulam, M. M.
(1981). Organization of afferent
input to subdivisions of area 8 in
the rhesus monkey. J. Comp. Neurol.
200, 407–431.
Barbas, H., and Pandya, D. N. (1989).
Architecture and intrinsic connec-
tions of the prefrontal cortex in the
rhesus monkey. J. Comp. Neurol.
286, 353–375.
Barbas, H., and Rempel-Clower, N.
(1997). Cortical structure pre-
dicts the pattern of corticocorti-
cal connections. Cereb. Cortex 7,
635–646.
Barbas, H., Saha, S., Rempel-Clower,
N., and Ghashghaei, T. (2003).
Serial pathways from primate pre-
frontal cortex to autonomic areas
may influence emotional expres-
sion. BMC Neurosci. 4:25. doi:
10.1186/1471-2202-4-25
Barbas, H., and Zikopoulos, B. (2006).
“Sequential and parallel circuits
for emotional processing in pri-
mate orbitofrontal cortex,” in The
Orbitofrontal Cortex, Vol. 1, eds Z.
David and R. Scott (Oxford: Oxford
University Press), 57–91.
Barbas, H., and Zikopoulos, B. (2007).
The prefrontal cortex and flexi-
ble behavior. Neuroscientist 13,
532–545.
Barbas, H., Zikopoulos, B., and Timbie,
C. (2011). Sensory pathways and
emotional context for action in
primate prefrontal cortex. Biol.
Psychiatry 69, 1133–1139.
Bard, P. (1928). A diencephalic mecha-
nism for the expression of rage with
special reference to the sympathetic
nervous system. Am. J. Physiol. 84,
490–516.
Bard, P., and Mountcastle, V. (1948).
Some forebrain mechanisms
involved in expression of rage with
special reference to suppression of
angry behavior. Res. Publ. Assoc.
Res. Nerv. Ment. Dis. 27, 362.
Barrett, L., and Bar, M. (2009). See
it with feeling: affective predictions
during object perception. Philos.
Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci. 364,
1325–1334.
Berretta, S., Pantazopoulos, H.,
Caldera, M., Pantazopoulos, P.,
and Paré, D. (2005). Infralimbic
cortex activation increases c-fos
expression in intercalated neurons
of the amygdala. Neuroscience 132,
943–953.
Björklund, A., and Dunnett, S. (2007).
Dopamine neuron systems in the
brain: an update. Trends Neurosci.
30, 194–202.
Bourgeais, L., Gauriau, C., and
Bernard, J. (2001). Projections
from the nociceptive area of the
central nucleus of the amygdala to
the forebrain: a pha-l study in the
rat. Eur. J. Neurosci. 14, 229–255.
Brown, S., and Schäfer, E. (1888). An
investigation into the functions of
the occipital and temporal lobes
of the monkey’s brain. Philos.
Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci. 179,
303–327.
Buckley, M. J., Mansouri, F. A., Hoda,
H., Mahboubi, M., Browning, P.
G. F., Kwok, S. C., et al. (2009).
Dissociable components of rule-
guided behavior depend on dis-
tinct medial and prefrontal regions.
Science 325, 52–58, 15317.
Bunce, J. G., and Barbas, H. (2011).
Prefrontal pathways target exci-
tatory and inhibitory systems
in memory-related medial tem-
poral cortices. Neuroimage 55,
1461–1474.
Burgess, P. W., Veitch, E., de Lacy, C. A.,
and Shallice, T. (2000). The cogni-
tive and neuroanatomical correlates
of multitasking. Neuropsychologia
38, 848–863.
Busti, D., Geracitano, R., Whittle, N.,
Dalezios, Y., Man´ko, M., Kaufmann,
W., et al. (2011). Different fear states
engage distinct networks within
the intercalated cell clusters of the
amygdala. J. Neurosci. 31, 5131.
Cannon, W. (1927). The James-Lange
theory of emotions: A critical exam-
ination and an alternative theory.
Am. J. Psychol. 39, 106–124.
Cannon, W., and Britton, S. (1925).
Studies on the conditions of activity
in endocrine glands XV. pseudaffec-
tive medulliadrenal secretion. Am. J.
Physiol. 72, 283–294.
Cardinal, R. N., Parkinson, J. A., Hall,
J., and Everitt, B. J. (2002). Emotion
and motivation: the role of the
amygdala, ventral striatum, and pre-
frontal cortex. Neurosci. Biobehav.
Rev. 26, 321–352.
Carmichael, S. T., and Price, J. L.
(1995). Limbic connections of the
orbital and medial prefrontal cor-
tex in macaque monkeys. J. Comp.
Neurol. 363, 615–641.
Chau, L., and Galvez, R. (2012).
Amygdala’s involvement in facili-
tating associative learning-induced
plasticity: a promiscuous role for
the amygdala in memory acquisi-
tion. Front. Integr. Neurosci. 6:92.
doi: 10.3389/fnint.2012.00092
Cho, Y., and Fudge, J. (2010).
Heterogeneous dopamine pop-
ulations project to specific
subregions of the primate amygdala.
Neuroscience 165, 1501–1518.
Collins, D., and Paré, D. (1999).
Spontaneous and evoked activity of
intercalated amygdala neurons. Eur.
J. Neurosci. 11, 3441–3448.
Crick, F. (1984). Function of the tha-
lamic reticular complex: the search-
light hypothesis. Proc. Natl. Acad.
Sci. U.S.A. 81, 4586–4590.
Dalton, G. L., Wu, D., Wang, Y.,
Floresco, S., and Phillips, A. (2012).
Nmda GluN2a and GluN2b recep-
tors play separate roles in the
induction of LTP and LTD in
the amygdala and in the acqui-
sition and extinction of condi-
tioned fear. Neuropharmacology 62,
797–806.
Damasio, A. (1994). Descartes’ Error:
Emotion, Reason, and the Human
Brain. New York, NY: Putnam.
Darwin, C. (1872). The Expression of
the Emotions in Man and Animals.
London: John Murray.
Davis, M., and Whalen, P. J. (2001).
The amygdala: vigilance and emo-
tion. Mol. Psychiatry 6, 13–34.
Debiac, J., and LeDoux, J. (2009). “The
amygdala and the neural pathways
of fear,” in Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder, eds J. P. Shiromani, T. M.
Keane, and J. LeDoux (New York,
NY: Humana Press), 23–38.
Diamond, D., Park, C., Campbell,
A., and Woodson, J. (2005).
Competitive interactions between
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org April 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 101 | 21
John et al. Modeling flexible learning in amygdala
endogenous LTD and LTP in the
hippocampus underlie the storage
of emotional memories and stress-
induced amnesia. Hippocampus 15,
1006–1025.
Ehrlich, I., Humeau, Y., Grenier, F.,
Ciocchi, S., Herry, C., and Lüthi, A.
(2009). Amygdala inhibitory cir-
cuits and the control of fear mem-
ory. Neuron 62, 757–771.
Erlich, J., Bush, D., and LeDoux, J.
(2012). The role of the lateral
amygdala in the retrieval and main-
tenance of fear-memories formed
by repeated probabilistic reinforce-
ment. Front. Behav. Neurosci. 6:16.
doi: 10.3389/fnbeh.2012.00016
Etkin, A., and Wager, T. D. (2007).
Functional neuroimaging of
anxiety: a meta-analysis of emo-
tional processing in ptsd, social
anxiety disorder, and specific
phobia. Am. J. Psychiatry 164,
1476.
Everitt, B. J., Cardinal, R. N., Parkinson,
J. A., and Robbins, T. W. (2003).
Appetitive behavior: impact of
amygdala-dependent mechanisms
of emotional learning. Ann. N.Y.
Acad. Sci. 985, 233–250.
Felleman, D. J., and Van Essen, D. C.
(1991). Distributed hierarchical
processing in the primate cerebral
cortex. Cereb. Cortex 1, 1–47.
Fossati, P. (2012). Neural corre-
lates of emotion processing:
from emotional to social brain.
Eur. Neuropsychopharmacol. 22,
S487–S491.
Fox, A. S., Shelton, S. E., Oakes, T. R.,
Converse, A. K., Davidson, R. J., and
Kalin, N. H. (2010). Orbitofrontal
cortex lesions alter anxiety-related
activity in the primate bed nucleus
of stria terminalis. J. Neurosci. 30,
7023–7027. 14541.
Frankland, P. W., Cestari, V.,
Filipkowski, R. K., McDonald,
R. J., and Silva, A. J. (1998). The
dorsal hippocampus is essential for
context discrimination but not for
contextual conditioning. Behav.
Neurosci. 112, 863.
Freedman, D., and Miller, E. (2008).
Neural mechanisms of visual cat-
egorization: insights from neuro-
physiology. Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev.
32, 311.
Freedman, D., Riesenhuber, M., Poggio,
T., and Miller, E. (2003). A com-
parison of primate prefrontal and
inferior temporal cortices during
visual categorization. J. Neurosci. 23,
5235–5246.
Froemke, R., and Martins, A. (2011).
Spectrotemporal dynamics of
auditory cortical synaptic receptive
field plasticity. Hear. Res. 279,
149–161.
Ghashghaei, H. T., and Barbas, H.
(2001). Neural interaction between
the basal forebrain and functionally
distinct prefrontal cortices in the
rhesus monkey. Neuroscience 103,
593–614.
Ghashghaei, H. T., and Barbas, H.
(2002). Pathways for emotions:
interactions of prefrontal and
anterior temporal pathways in the
amygdala of the rhesus monkey.
Neuroscience 115, 1261–1279.
Ghashghaei, H. T., Hilgetag, C. C.,
and Barbas, H. (2007). Sequence
of information processing for emo-
tions based on the anatomic dia-
logue between prefrontal cortex and
amygdala. Neuroimage 34, 905–923.
Grossberg, S. (1973). Contour
enhancement, short term memory,
and constancies in reverberating
neural networks. Stud. Appl. Math.
52, 213–257.
Guillery, R. W., and Harting, J. K.
(2003). Structure and connections
of the thalamic reticular nucleus:
Advancing views over half a century.
J. Comp. Neurol. 463, 360–371.
Hadj-Bouziane, F., Bell, A. H., Knusten,
T. A., Ungerleider, L. G., and Tootell,
R. B. (2008). Perception of emo-
tional expressions is independent of
face selectivity in monkey inferior
temporal cortex. Proc. Natl. Acad.
Sci. U.S.A. 105, 5591–5596. 12633.
Hartley, C., Fischl, B., and Phelps,
E. (2011). Brain structure corre-
lates of individual differences in the
acquisition and inhibition of con-
ditioned fear. Cereb. Cortex 21,
1954–1962.
Hasselmo, M. E. (2006). The role of
acetylcholine in learning and mem-
ory. Curr. Opin. Neurobiol. 16,
710–715. 11984.
Hoistad, M., and Barbas, H. (2008).
Sequence of information process-
ing for emotions through pathways
linking temporal and insular cor-
tices with the amygdala. Neuroimage
40, 1016–1033.
Johansen, J. P., Tarpley, J. W., LeDoux,
J. E., and Blair, H. T. (2010).
Neural substrates for expectation-
modulated fear learning in the
amygdala and periaqueductal gray.
Nat. Neurosci. 13, 979–986.
Kalin, N. H., Shelton, S. E., and
Davidson, R. J. (2004). The role of
the central nucleus of the amygdala
in mediating fear and anxiety in the
primate. J. Neurosci. 24, 5506–5515.
15558.
Kalin, N. H., Shelton, S. E., and
Davidson, R. J. (2007). Role
of the primate orbitofrontal cor-
tex in mediating anxious tem-
perament. Biol. Psychiatry 62,
1134–1139. 14424.
Kheirbek, M. A., Klemenhagen, K. C.,
Sahay, A., and Hen, R. (2012).
Neurogenesis and generalization: a
new approach to stratify and treat
anxiety disorders. Nat. Neurosci. 15,
1613–1620.
Kilgard, M. P., and Merzenich, M. M.
(1998). Cortical map reorganization
enabled by nucleus basalis activity.
Science 279, 1714–1718.
Klüver, H., and Bucy, P. C. (1937).
“Psychic blindness” and other
symptoms following bilateral tem-
poral lobectomy in rhesus monkeys.
Am. J. Physiol. 119, 352–353.
Krasne, F. B., Fanselow, M. S.,
and Zelikowsky, M. (2011).
Design of a neurally plau-
sible model of fear learning.
Front. Behav. Neurosci. 5:41. doi:
10.3389/fnbeh.2011.00041
LaBar, K. S., Gatenby, J. C., Gore, J. C.,
LeDoux, J. E., and Phelps, E. A.
(1998). Human amygdala activation
during conditioned fear acquisition
and extinction: a mixed-trial fmri
study. Neuron 20, 937–945.
LaLumiere, R., Nguyen, L., and
McGaugh, J. (2004). Post-training
intrabasolateral amygdala infusions
of dopamine modulate consol-
idation of inhibitory avoidance
memory: involvement of noradren-
ergic and cholinergic systems. Euro.
J. Neurosci. 20, 2804–2810.
Lanuza, E., Nader, K., and LeDoux,
J. E. (2004). Unconditioned stimu-
lus pathways to the amygdala: effects
of posterior thalamic and corti-
cal lesions on fear conditioning.
Neuroscience 125, 305–315.
LeDoux, J. E. (1992). Brain mech-
anisms of emotion and emotional
learning. Curr. Opin. Neurobiol. 2,
191–197.
Li, G. S., Amano, T., Paré, D., and
Nair, S. S. (2011). Impact of infral-
imbic inputs on intercalated amyg-
dala neurons: a biophysical mod-
eling study. Learn. Mem. 18,
226–240.
Lim, S. L., Padmala, S., and Pessoa,
L. (2009). Segregating the sig-
nificant from the mundane on a
moment-to-moment basis via direct
and indirect amygdala contribu-
tions. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.
106, 16841–16846. 14787.
Lissek, S., and Grillon, C. (2010).
Overgeneralization of conditioned
fear in the anxiety disorders. J.
Psychol. 218, 146–148.
López de Armentia, M., and Sah, P.
(2007). Bidirectional synaptic plas-
ticity at nociceptive afferents in the
rat central amygdala. J. Physiol. 581,
961–970.
MacLean, P. (1949). Psychosomatic dis-
ease and the “visceral brain”: recent
developments bearing on the papez
theory of emotion. Psychosom. Med.
11, 338–353.
Mahan, A. L., and Ressler, K. J.
(2012). Fear conditioning, synap-
tic plasticity and the amygdala:
implications for posttraumatic
stress disorder. Trends Neurosci. 35,
24–35.
Manko, M., Geracitano, R., and
Capogna, M. (2011). Functional
connectivity of the main inter-
calated nucleus of the mouse
amygdala. J. Physiol. (Lond.) 589,
1911–1925. 15285.
Maren, S. (2001). Neurobiology of
pavlovian fear conditioning. Annu.
Rev. Neurosci. 24, 897–931.
McAlonan, K., Cavanaugh, J., and
Wurtz, R. H. (2008). Guarding
the gateway to cortex with atten-
tion in visual thalamus. Nature 456,
391–394.
McGaugh, J. (2004). The amyg-
dala modulates the consolidation of
memories of emotionally arousing
experiences. Annu. Rev. Neurosci.
27, 1–28.
McGaugh, J. L. (2002). Memory con-
solidation and the amygdala: a sys-
tems perspective. Trends Neurosci.
25, 456.
McNally, G. P., Johansen, J. P., and Blair,
H. T. (2011). Placing prediction into
the fear circuit. Trends Neurosci. 34,
283–292.
Medalla, M., and Barbas, H. (2009).
Synapses with inhibitory neurons
differentiate anterior cingulate from
dorsolateral prefrontal pathways
associated with cognitive control.
Neuron 61, 609–620.
Medalla, M., and Barbas, H. (2010).
Anterior cingulate synapses in
prefrontal areas 10 and 46 suggest
differential influence in cogni-
tive control. J. Neurosci. 30,
16068–16081.
Medalla, M., and Barbas, H. (2012).
The anterior cingulate cortex may
enhance inhibition of lateral pre-
frontal cortex via m2 cholinergic
receptors at dual synaptic sites. J.
Neurosci. 32, 15611–15625.
Mesulam, M. M., Hersh, L. B., Mash,
D. C., and Geula, C. (1992).
Differential cholinergic innervation
within functional subdivisions
of the human cerebral cortex: a
choline acetyltransferase study. J.
Comp. Neurol. 318, 316–328.
Miasnikov, A., Chen, J., and
Weinberger, N. (2009). Behavioral
memory induced by stimulation
of the nucleus basalis: effects of
contingency reversal. Neurobiol.
Learn. Mem. 91, 298–309.
Montero, V. M. (1997). c-fos induc-
tion in sensory pathways of rats
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org April 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 101 | 22
John et al. Modeling flexible learning in amygdala
exploring a novel complex envi-
ronment: shifts of active thalamic
reticular sectors by predominant
sensory cues. Neuroscience 76,
1069–1081.
Müller, T., Albrecht, D., and Gebhardt,
C. (2009). Both NR2a and NR2b
subunits of the NMDA receptor are
critical for long-term potentiation
and long-term depression in the lat-
eral amygdala of horizontal slices
of adult mice. Learn. Mem. 16,
395–405.
Nader, K., and LeDoux, J. (1999).
Inhibition of the mesoamygdala
dopaminergic pathway impairs the
retrieval of conditioned fear asso-
ciations. Behav. Neurosci. 113,
891–901.
Napier, R., Macrae, M., and Kehoe,
E. (1992). Rapid reaquisition in
conditioning of the rabbit’s nictitat-
ing membrane response. J. Exp.
Psychol. Anim. Behav. Process. 18,
182–192.
Nauta, W. J. H. (1979). “Expanding
borders of the limbic system con-
cept,” in Functional Neurosurgery,
eds T. Rasmussen and R. Marino
(New York, NY: Raven Press),
7–23.
Nitschke, J. B., Sarinopoulos, I., Oathes,
D. J., Johnstone, T., Whalen, P. J.,
Davidson, R. J., et al. (2009).
Anticipatory activation in the amyg-
dala and anterior cingulate in gener-
alized anxiety disorder and predic-
tion of treatment response. Am. J.
Psychiatry 166, 302.
Ongur, D., An, X., and Price, J. L.
(1998). Prefrontal cortical pro-
jections to the hypothalamus in
macaque monkeys. J. Comp. Neurol.
401, 480–505.
Palomares-Castillo, E., Hernández-
Pérez, O., Pérez-Carrera, D.,
Crespo-Ramírez, M., Fuxe, K., and
Pérez de la Mora, M. (2012). The
intercalated paracapsular islands as
a module for integration of signals
regulating anxiety in the amygdala.
Brain Res. 1476, 211–234.
Pape, H. C., and Paré, D. (2010). Plastic
synaptic networks of the amyg-
dala for the acquisition, expression,
and extinction of conditioned fear.
Physiol. Rev. 90, 419–463.
Papez, J. W. (1937). A proposed
mechanism of emotion. Am. Med.
Assoc. Arch. Neurol. Psychiatry 38,
725–743.
Paré, D., and Smith, Y. (1993).
Distribution of GABA immunore-
activity in the amygdaloid complex
of the cat. Neuroscience 57,
1061–1076.
Paré, D., and Smith, Y. (1994).
Gabaergic projection from the
intercalated cell masses of the
amygdala to the basal forebrain in
cats. J. Comp. Neurol. 344, 33–49.
7120.
Parikh, V., and Sarter, M. (2008).
Cholinergic mediation of attention:
contributions of phasic and tonic
increases in prefrontal cholinergic
activity. Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci. 1129,
225–235.
Paus, T. (2001). Primate anterior cin-
gulate cortex: where motor control,
drive and cognition interface. Nat.
Rev. Neurosci. 2, 417–424.
Pavlov, I. (1927). Conditioned Reflexes:
An Investigation of the Physiological
Activities of the Cerebral Cortex.
London: Oxford University Press.
Pearce, J., and Bouton, M. (2001).
Theories of associative learning in
animals. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 52,
111–139.
Pessoa, L. (2008). On the relation-
ship between emotion and cogni-
tion. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 9, 148–158.
Pessoa, L. (2010). Emotion and
cognition and the amygdala:
from “what is it?” to “what’s to
be done?” Neuropsychologia 48,
3416–3429.
Petrof, I., and Brown, V. J. (2010).
Attention to visual, but not tac-
tile, properties of a stimulus results
in activation of fos protein in the
visual thalamic reticular nucleus
of rats. Behav. Brain Res. 211,
248–252.
Pinard, C., Mascagni, F., and
McDonald, A. (2012). Medial
prefrontal cortical innervation of
the intercalated nuclear region of
the amygdala. Neuroscience 205,
112–124.
Pinault, D. (2004). The thalamic
reticular nucleus: structure, func-
tion and concept. Brain Res. Rev. 46,
1–31.
Pinto, A., and Sesack, S. (2008).
Ultrastructural analysis of pre-
frontal cortical inputs to the rat
amygdala: spatial relationships to
presumed dopamine axons and
d1 and d2 receptors. Brain Struct.
Funct. 213, 159–175.
Porrino, L. J., Crane, A. M., and
Goldman-Rakic, P. S. (1981). Direct
and indirect pathways from the
amygdala to the frontal lobe in rhe-
sus monkeys. J. Comp. Neurol. 198,
121–136.
Pourtois, G., Spinelli, L., Seeck, M., and
Vuilleumier, P. (2010a). Temporal
precedence of emotion over atten-
tion modulations in the lateral
amygdala: Intracranial erp evidence
from a patient with temporal lobe
epilepsy. Cogn. Affect. Behav.
Neurosci. 10, 83–93. 15078.
Pourtois, G., Vocat, R., N’Diaye,
K., Spinelli, L., Seeck, M., and
Vuilleumier, P. (2010b). Errors
recruit both cognitive and
emotional monitoring systems:
simultaneous intracranial record-
ings in the dorsal anterior cingulate
gyrus and amygdala combined
with fmri. Neuropsychologia 48,
1144–1159.
Quirk, G. J., Likhtik, E., Pelletier, J. G.,
and Paré, D. (2003). Stimulation of
medial prefrontal cortex decreases
the responsiveness of central amyg-
dala output neurons. J. Neurosci. 23,
8800–8807. 10279.
Ramanathan, D., Tuszynski, M., and
Conner, J. (2009). The basal fore-
brain cholinergic system is required
specifically for behaviorally medi-
ated cortical map plasticity. J.
Neurosci. 29, 5992–6000.
Rempel-Clower, N. L., and Barbas,
H. (1998). Topographic organi-
zation of connections between the
hypothalamus and prefrontal cortex
in the rhesus monkey. J. Comp.
Neurol. 398, 393–419. 7114.
Rescorla, R. A., and Wagner, A. R.
(1972). “A theory of Pavlovian
conditioning: variations in the
effectiveness of reinforcement and
nonreinforcement,” in Classical
Conditioning II: Current Research
and Theory, eds A. H. Black
and W. F. Prokasy (New York,
NY: Appleton-Century-Crofts),
64–99.
Ricker, S., and Bouton, M. (1996).
Reacquisition following extinction
in appetitive conditioning. Anim.
Learn. Behav. 24, 423–436.
Rolls, E. T., and Grabenhorst, F.
(2008). The orbitofrontal cor-
tex and beyond: from affect to
decision-making. Prog. Neurobiol.
86, 216–244. 13226.
Rushworth, M. F., Buckley, M. J.,
Behrens, T. E., Walton, M. E.,
and Bannerman, D. M. (2007).
Functional organization of the
medial frontal cortex. Curr. Opin.
Neurobiol. 17, 220–227.
Sah, P., Faber, E. S., Lopez, D. A., and
Power, J. (2003). The amygdaloid
complex: anatomy and physiology.
Physiol. Rev. 83, 803–834.
Sarinopoulos, I., Dixon, G. E., Short,
S. J., Davidson, R. J., and Nitschke,
J. B. (2006). Brain mechanisms of
expectation associated with insula
and amygdala response to aver-
sive taste: implications for placebo.
Brain Behav. Immun. 20, 120–132.
Sarter, M., and Parikh, V. (2005).
Choline transporters, cholinergic
transmission and cognition. Nat.
Rev. Neurosci. 6, 48–56.
Schall, J. D., Morel, A., King, D. J.,
and Bullier, J. (1995). Topography
of visual cortex connections with
frontal eye field in macaque: con-
vergence and segregation of pro-
cessing streams. J. Neurosci. 15,
4464–4487.
Schiller, D., Levy, I., Niv, Y., LeDoux,
J. E., and Phelps, E. A. (2008). From
fear to safety and back: reversal of
fear in the human brain. J. Neurosci.
28, 11517–11525. 15571.
Schiller, D., Monfils, M.-H., Raio,
C. M., Johnson, D. C., LeDoux,
J. E., and Phelps, E. A. (2009).
Preventing the return of fear in
humans using reconsolidation
update mechanisms. Nature 463,
49–53.
Schoenbaum, G., Saddoris, M., and
Stalnaker, T. (2007). Reconciling
the roles of orbitofrontal cortex in
reversal learning and the encoding
of outcome expectancies. Ann. N.Y.
Acad. Sci. 1121, 320–335.
Sehlmeyer, C., Schöning, S.,
Zwitserlood, P. B. P., Kircher,
T., Arolt, V., and Konrad, C. (2009).
Human fear conditioning and
extinction in neuroimaging: a sys-
tematic review. PLoS ONE 4:e5865.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0005865
Shackman, A. J., Salomons, T. V.,
Slagter, H. A., Fox, A. S., Winter, J. J.,
and Davidson, R. J. (2011). The
integration of negative affect, pain
and cognitive control in the cingu-
late cortex. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 12,
154–167. 15762.
Sierra-Mercado, D., Padilla-Coreano,
N., and Quirk, G. (2010).
Dissociable roles of prelimbic
and infralimbic cortices, ventral
hippocampus, and basolateral
amygdala in the expression and
extinction of conditioned fear.
Neuropsychopharmacology 36,
529–538.
Sotres-Bayon, F., and Quirk, G. J.
(2010). Prefrontal control of fear:
more than just extinction. Curr.
Opin. Neurobiol. 20, 231.
Spiegel, E., Miller, H., and
Oppenheimer, M. (1940). Forebrain
and rage reactions. J. Neurophysiol.
3, 538–548.
Stalnaker, T. A., Franz, T. M., Singh,
T., and Schoenbaum, G. (2007).
Basolateral amygdala lesions abol-
ish orbitofrontal-dependent reversal
impairments. Neuron 54, 51–58.
Sutton, R. S., and Barto, A. G.
(1998). Reinforcement Learning: An
Introduction, Vol. 1. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
van Well, S., Visser, R., Scholte, H., and
Kindt, M. (2012). Neural substrates
of individual differences in human
fear learning: evidence from con-
current fMRI fear-potentiated star-
tle, and US-expectancy data. Cogn.
Affect. Behav. Neurosci. 12, 499–512.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org April 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 101 | 23
John et al. Modeling flexible learning in amygdala
Vertes, R. (2004). Differential projec-
tions of the infralimbic and prelim-
bic cortex in the rat. Synapse 51,
32–58.
Vertes, R. P. (2006). Interactions among
the medial prefrontal cortex, hip-
pocampus and midline thalamus in
emotional and cognitive processing
in the rat. Neuroscience 142, 1–20.
Vogt, B. A., Vogt, L., Farber, N. B.,
and Bush, G. (2005). Architecture
and neurocytology of monkey cin-
gulate gyrus. J. Comp. Neurol. 485,
218–239. 11079.
Vuilleumier, P. (2005). How brains
beware: neural mechanisms of emo-
tional attention. Trends Cogn. Sci. 9,
585–594.
Vuilleumier, P., Richardson, M. P.,
Armony, J. L., Driver, J., and Dolan,
R. J. (2004). Distant influences
of amygdala lesion on visual cor-
tical activation during emotional
face processing. Nat. Neurosci. 7,
1271–1278.
Wallis, J., and Miller, E. (2003).
Neuronal activity in primate
dorsolateral and orbital prefrontal
cortex during performance of a
reward preference task. Eur. J.
Neurosci. 18, 2069–2081.
Weese, G. D., Phillips, J. M., and Brown,
V. J. (1999). Attentional orienting is
impaired by unilateral lesions of the
thalamic reticular nucleus in the rat.
J. Neurosci. 19, 10135–10139.
Weiskrantz, L. (1956). Behavoiral
changes associated with ablation of
the amygdaloid complex in mon-
keys. J. Comp. Physiol. Psychol. 49,
381–391.
Whalen, P., and Phelps, E. (2009). The
Human Amygdala. New York, NY:
Guilford Press.
Yakovlev, P. I. (1948). Motility, behav-
ior and the brain: stereodynamic
organization and neurocoordinates
of behavior. J. Nerv. Ment. Dis. 107,
313–335.
Zikopoulos, B., and Barbas, H. (2006).
Prefrontal projections to the thala-
mic reticular nucleus form a unique
circuit for attentional mechanisms.
J. Neurosci. 26, 7348–7361.
Zikopoulos, B., and Barbas, H. (2007).
Circuits for multisensory integra-
tion and attentional modulation
through the prefrontal cortex and
the thalamic reticular nucleus
in primates. Rev. Neurosci. 18,
417–438.
Zikopoulos, B., and Barbas, H.
(2011). The intercalated Nucleus
of the Primate Amygdala. Program
No. 597.01. 2012 Neuroscience
Meeting Planner. New Orleans,
LA: Society for Neuroscience,
2012.
Zikopoulos, B., and Barbas, H. (2012).
Pathways for emotions and atten-
tion converge on the thalamic retic-
ular nucleus in primates. J. Neurosci.
32, 5338–5350.
Zweifel, L., Fadok, J., Argilli, E.,
Garelick, M., Jones, G., Dickerson,
T., et al. (2011). Activation
of dopamine neurons is crit-
ical for aversive conditioning
and prevention of general-
ized anxiety. Nat. Neurosci. 14,
620–626.
Conflict of Interest Statement: The
authors declare that the research
was conducted in the absence of any
commercial or financial relationships
that could be construed as a potential
conflict of interest.
Received: 22 December 2012; accepted:
11 March 2013; published online: 02
April 2013.
Citation: John YJ, Bullock D, Zikopoulos
B and Barbas H (2013) Anatomy and
computational modeling of networks
underlying cognitive-emotional interac-
tion. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 7:101. doi:
10.3389/fnhum.2013.00101
Copyright © 2013 John, Bullock,
Zikopoulos and Barbas. This is an open-
access article distributed under the terms
of the Creative Commons Attribution
License, which permits use, distribution
and reproduction in other forums,
provided the original authors and source
are credited and subject to any copyright
notices concerning any third-party
graphics etc.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org April 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 101 | 24
John et al. Modeling flexible learning in amygdala
APPENDIX
METHODS
Our modeling approach can be described as
“phenomenological”—the equations governing neural activity
and synaptic weight change are not intended to accurately reflect
fine-grained biophysical detail or fit quantitative experimental
data. Instead, our simplified model provides qualitative results
that agree with several experimental studies, and also allow
us to suggest possible functional roles for components of the
network. As described in the Introduction, this approach can
address several questions related to how the components of the
amygdalar local circuit work together as a substrate for flexible
fear-related learning and responding.
We implement the model as a rate-coded system to investigate
those properties of the amygdalar network that depend on con-
nectivity, rather than fine-grained biophysical details. We assume
as a first approximation that all the model neurons obey the
same set of differential equations. We assign an activity xs to each
neuron s:
τxs
dxs
dt
= −Asxs + (Bs − xs)Es − (xs + Cs)Is (A1)
where subscript s is an index for the particular neuron in
the network, and Es and Is correspond to the excitatory and
inhibitory inputs, respectively. The term A specifies the passive
decay rate, B is the maximum activity (B > 0), and −C is the
minimum activity (C ≥ 0). The time constant of integration
is τxs .
Synaptic weight changes occur via the following learning rule:
τc
dWc
dt
= {−AcWc + R(Wm − Wc)}
[
xpre
]+ [
xpost
]+
(A2)
where Wc is a connection weight between two neurons,
R is a reinforcing signal, xpre is the presynaptic neu-
ral activity, and xpost is the postsynaptic neural activity.
The constant Wm is the maximum attainable weight. The
square brackets indicate positive rectification (if q ≥ 0,
[q] =+ q, else [q] =+ 0). The weight change is presynapti-
cally and postsynaptically gated. Weight Wc increases if xpre
and xpost take non-zero values and the teaching signal R is
simultaneously greater than zero. Weight Wc decreases if xpre
and xpost take non-zero values, but there is no accompanying
teaching signal, i.e., R = 0. Parameter Ac represents a rate of
gated decay or “active forgetting.” Subscript c is an index that
specifies the connection (see Table A1 for a complete list). For
example, in Table A1, WCTXi → LAi corresponds to the connec-
tion weight from the ith cortical cell to the corresponding LA
neuron.
Let there be N cells each in CTX, LA, and BA. Each CTX neu-
ron receives one input Ei (where i is an index that runs from
1 to N). Each Ei is a neutral stimulus that can, after learning,
come to modulate an emotional response. Each Ei can repre-
sent a point in a feature space, such as a particular auditory
frequency. Each CTX cell sends excitatory projections to nearby
CTX cells, as well as inhibitory projections, which can be inter-
preted as taking place via intermediary inhibitory interneurons,
as depicted in the top inset of Figure 3. Parameters are cho-
sen so that the CTX cells work together as a distance-dependent
on-center off-surround network. Excitatory connections between
CTX cells are determined by a Gaussian, such that
WECTXk →CTXi = e−[(k− i)/σE ]
2
(A3)
Table A1 | Excitatory and inhibitory inputs to each network
component.
Cell index Excitation term Es Inhibition term Is
CTXi Ei +
N∑
k = 1
WECTXk →CTXi Ek
N∑
k = 1
WICTXk →CTXi Ek
LAi fLAWCTXi →LAi
[
CTXi
]+ 0
BAi WLAi →BAi
[
xLAi
]+ 0
ITCd
N∑
i = 1
WLAi → ITCd
[
xLAi
]+ + EILd 0
ITCv
N∑
i = 1
WBAi → ITCv
[
xBAi
]+ + EILv WITCd→ ITCv [xITCd]+
CeM
N∑
i = 1
[
xBAi
]+ WITCv→CeM [xITCv]+
Table A2 | Parameter values common to all simulations.
Parameter Value
N 20
Ei 10 (peak value)
τx 0.001
ACTXi 0.1
BCTXi 2
CCTXi 2
ALAi ,BAi , ITCd, ITCv,CeM 10
BLAi ,BAi , ITCd, ITCv,CeM 2
CLAi ,BAi , ITCd, ITCv,CeM 0
fLA 10
τCTXi →LAi 0.0016
ACTXi →LAi 0.001
τLAi →BAi 0.0066
ALAi →BAi 0.001
τLAi → ITCd 0.133
ALAi → ITCd 50
τBAi → ITCv 0.133
ABAi → ITCv 50
Wm 20
WITCd→ ITCv 10
WITCv→CeM 25
Ws(t = 0) 0.05
Terms with “(t = 0)” specify initial values.
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Similarly, inhibitory connections between CTX cells are given by
WICTXk →CTXi = fI e−[(k− i)/σI ]
2
(A4)
where fI governs the strength of inhibition.
Each CTX cell projects to a corresponding LA cell, resulting in
a one-to-one topographic mapping. Similarly, each LA output in
turn serves as an input to a corresponding BA neuron. All subse-
quent processing stages involve a convergence or fan-in of activity
from LA and BA. There is a single activity corresponding to each
of the following regions: ITCd, ITCv, and CeM. The excitatory
input to ITCd consists of a weighted sum of inputs from LA. The
excitatory input to ITCv consists of a weighted sumof inputs from
BA. ITCd inhibits ITCv. The excitatory input to CeM consists of a
sum of inputs from BA. The inputs to CeM are not weighted, and
are not subject to synaptic change.
The activities of the artificial neurons in Figure 3 are each
governed by equation A1, with the excitation term Es and inhi-
bition term Is specified in Table A1. Weight change occurs via
equation A2 in the following sets of weights: WCTXi , WLAi →BAi ,
WLAi → ITCd, and WBAi → ITCv. The teaching signal R for the first
three of these sets is given by R+, which takes a value of 1 when
the US is present, and is zero otherwise. The teaching signal R−
for WBAi → ITCv is assumed to carry complementary information
to R+, and is given by:
R− = (1 − R+)sgn
{
N∑
i= 1
[xBAi ]+
}
(A5)
This term can also be described as a binary expectation-violation
signal. If the sign of the sum of BA activities is interpreted as a
long-term expectation of the US co-occurring with the CS, then
R− takes non-zero values when there is a discrepancy between the
outcome and the expectation encoded by the BA activities, i.e.,
when [xBAi ]+ take non-zero values, but there is no US signal, so
R+ = 0.
SIMULATION DETAILS
In all the simulations shown here, parameters take the values
specified in Table A2. The equations are integrated using the sim-
ple Euler method, with a step size of 0.00001. The simulations
are run for 40,000 time steps, so each epoch lasts for 10,000 time
steps. The CSs (CS1 and CS2) and US are rectangular pulses. The
onset of US occurs at the half-way point of the CS. The CS and
US are reset to zero simultaneously. Activities xs begin at zero,
and are reset whenever the CS signal returns to zero. The val-
ues of the strengths of inhibition fI , excitatory input EILd from
IL to ITCd and excitatory input EILv from IL to ITCv vary across
different simulations, as specified in the corresponding figure
captions.
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